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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and legal scholars in law and development have failed to
understand that law is peripheral, not central, to the development problem of poor countries. Even as legal scholars in other fields increasingly
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recognize the need to study norms and the interaction of norms and
law,1 law and development scholars remain seemingly blind to this phenomenon. In this Article, I argue that norms matter, or more controversially, culture matters to law and development. The observation, that
culture matters, and the proposal, that it be examined and evaluated, run
counter to the tradition of public and private international law. Law and
development, however, must disassociate itself from this long-standing
tradition.
In this Article, I seek to address how culture aids or retards economic
development and propose that the field of law and development pursue
the objective of purposive culture change. Law and development scholars have yet to ask the key question: after so many years of drafting new
laws to spur development, why is the field still characterized by failure?
Does it need more laws, especially if “law” is viewed in essentially instrumentalist terms, that is, as a means to an end—whether it be to
lower transaction costs or protect parties’ expectations or restrain state
power.
I propose that law and development move beyond law and the technical dimensions of the “rule of law.” As slippery a concept as culture
may be and as complex and controversial as the notion of culture
change undoubtedly is, particularly given the history of colonialism, I
argue that we must enter the cultural milieu and ask whether certain cultural attributes in a given society are an impediment to that society’s
economic development. Law may still be relevant, but only if it is also
viewed culturally, and not just instrumentally, “as the embodiment of
norms…and the repository of social meanings.”2 If law embodies or reflects norms, then norms must accordingly be addressed, especially
those that may be at odds with development objectives.
Law and development assistance must therefore confront even issues
that seem to be part of a country’s proclaimed cultural identity. Examples include specific practices: India’s caste system and the preferences
of many generations of high caste Indians for economic and social segregation; restrictions on education for girls in many poor countries; the
prohibition on charging interest because it is an essential part of the “Islamic way of life”; personalistic and group-focused relationships as well
as patterns of authority that discourage individual wealth accumulation,
1. For an examination of law/norm interaction, see Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and
Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 857–74 (1999).
2. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities,
53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 973–74 (2005).

2007]

CULTURE CHANGE

359

especially by those not from the traditional ruling elites. Additionally,
this Article advocates confronting not just specific practices but also
general inclinations, values, preferences or mindsets that do not contribute positively towards economic development. Examples include views
about authority and dominance, status as an inherited rather than acquired attribute; the relationship between the collective and the individual; superstitions and the tendency to exalt the past. My argument to focus on culture rests on the following claim—that economic
development is not only an economic or legal process but also a “cultural process.”3 A “rule of law” project as such will be insufficient to reduce poverty or implement the other objectives of law and development.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sketches the field, its supposed demise and its revival in recent years. This resurrection is due
partly to the events of September 11, 2001, whereby law and development is viewed in a new light, in the United States in particular, not just
as a do-good effort but as a crucial component in the fight against terrorism. I argue this effort will fail without a cultural focus. Part II examines how international law has focused on states and ignored culture,
except as a byproduct of the colonial project and its civilizing mission.
To the extent culture is now incorporated at all, it is presumed that cultures cannot be changed or interfered with but rather are to be protected
as part of the right to self-determination. Part III argues that notwithstanding colonial history, law and development must go beyond market
initiatives and legal reforms to include a cultural component, especially
where “‘cultural lock-in’”4 is a contributing cause of continuing poverty.
In making this argument, I refer to various historical instances of culture transformations, in response to both internal and external ferment,
to suggest how a culture change agenda may be undertaken. Japan’s
modernization is one such example. I also examine current efforts to
transform practices and attitudes that are cultural but are also detrimental to economic development. In the process, this Article wrestles with
the following dilemmas: whether and how these practices and beliefs
should be changed, in a manner that may begin with passing the necessary laws but also has to go beyond “mere” laws; and how new norms
can be introduced, especially those that run counter to patterns of
3. Mariano Grondona, A Cultural Typology of Economic Development, in CULTURE
MATTERS 44, 46 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000).
4. Timur Kuran, Cultural Obstacles to Economic Development: Often Overstated, Usually
Transitory, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 115, 117 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds.,
2004).
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thought and behavior that people have experienced most of their lives.
Accordingly, this Article will address complications that may arise when
culture change is externally influenced or induced.
Part III is only the beginning of a larger scholarly project in which I
address both the normative and prescriptive dimensions of culture
change. In addition to the “how to” or “tool kit” aspects of culture
change, there are also normative implications. Clearly, a disturbing tension runs through the proposal. On the one hand, development ideally
should have grassroots participation and support,5 and development objectives should be subjected to “informed choice, aided by public discussion, critical scrutiny, and a participatory political environment.”6 On
the other hand, participatory development in communities characterized
by hierarchical patterns of authority may also be susceptible to capture
by the traditional elites themselves, calling for a return to, not surprisingly, traditional culture.
In the age of globalization, culture is not likely to remain “pure”
(even assuming it once was), and arguments about cultural purity and
autonomy are not convincing. Culture is neither homogeneous nor
monolithic; indeed, even within a culture, people are dissenting from
and contesting inherited cultural norms and meanings.7 As the noted
economist and 1998 Nobel Laureate in Economics Amartya Sen remarked, “the cultural dimension of development requires closer scrutiny
in development analysis. It is important to investigate the different
ways…in which culture should be taken into account in examining the
challenges of development, and in assessing the demands of sound economic strategies.”8
Although law does have an expressive function and thus certain laws
make certain statements which could in turn influence social norms,9
5. The World Bank has recently initiated a Comprehensive Development Framework which
promotes greater local participation in development projects, particularly from Nongovernmental
Organizations. See Lan Cao, An Evaluation of the World Bank’s New Comprehensive Development Framework, in PRIVATISING DEVELOPMENT 27 (Michael B. Likosky ed., 2005);see also
Amartya Sen, How Does Culture Matter?, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, supra note 4, at 37,
53 (“An overarching value must be the need for participatory decision making on the kind of society people want to live in, based on open discussion….”).
6. Sen, supra note 5, at 55.
7. See generally Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001) (arguing
that law should recognize the heterogeneity within a culture and should not reflexively privilege
the cultural authenticity claims of elites against dissenters who wish to transform aspects of that
culture).
8. Sen, supra note 5, at 37.
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–
25 (1996).
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this capacity to affect preferences and beliefs through law is questionable in countries where the rule of law is itself weak. For those countries, law is insufficient and culture change will be needed.

I.
A.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

Law and Development After 9/11: Development as National
Security

Law and development as a field has been revived after many years of
decline and disillusionment.10 The crisis was partly fueled by the events
of the 1960s when Western institutions were deemed flawed11 and
many, particularly those intimately associated with the movement, questioned the objectives of law and development12 and the institution of
law itself.13 In other words, if law and development scholars aimed to
assist poor countries in establishing Western style markets and laws,14
and if the integrity of the latter is questioned even in developed, Western
societies,15 then the essence of the movement itself must be questioned
as well.16
10. See, e.g., LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala
eds., 1993); John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977); David
Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WISC. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
11. For a critique of the law and development movement and its self-proclaimed crisis and
despair, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L
L. 470, 472 (1995) (reviewing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (VOL. 2, LEGAL CULTURES, Anthony
Carty ed., 1992) and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD, supra note 10.).
12. David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society
Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4, 23 (1990) (characterizing the law and development movement as one aimed at “exporting democratic capitalism” to countries “too poor or benighted to
grasp the possibilities of this superior form of civilization”).
13. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 1083–84.
14. See David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1972) (describing how law is necessary to the establishment
of markets because law provides predictable, universal rules, thus ensuring that economic activities and fruits generated therefrom will be protected). More specifically, law and development
scholars supported the establishment in developing countries of capital market programs to foster
Western-style regulatory and private property regimes. Id. at 45–46.
15. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 1083 (claiming that, even in the United States,
law is instrumental in perpetuating “domination by elite groups” and “arbitrary actions by government”). For a compelling criticism of Western disillusionment, see Tamanaha, supra note 11,
at 474.
16. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 1070, 1080 (condemning the liberal-legalism
model previously advocated as “ethnocentric and naïve” because the model is ignorant of the re-
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Law and development was revived by the demise of the Soviet Union
and the need to aid transitional or post-crisis countries. Despite professed concerns about the project’s basic premise—to modernize developing countries—the thrust of law and development continues to be
about modernization,17 which is essentially to establish working markets
and construct a rule of law framework.18 Since September 11, 2001, law
and development has taken on an even greater sense of urgency. International security experts view it as a necessary component of terrorism
prevention.19 Some argue that the United States has traditionally combated terrorism by using a “supply-side” only approach that is ineffective, that is, by “regarding terrorism as the product of organized groups
that could be confronted and destroyed, without regard to their aims or
to the reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing members.”20
These commentators suggest that the United States should also engage
the “demand side” of terrorism, that is, by understanding that “[p]ublic
despair and humiliation are often fertile ground for terror organizers to
exploit”21 and by addressing those underlying factors through support
for economic development and political change.22 One reason “the Middle East is a prime target for terrorist recruiters”23 is “its exceedingly
high unemployment rate, evaporating gross domestic product growth,
alities of Third World countries).
17. Modernization theory holds that “development was an inevitable, evolutionary process of
increasing societal differentiation that would ultimately produce economic, political and social
institutions similar to those in the West. The outcome of this process would be the creation of a
free market system, liberal democratic political institutions, and the rule of law.” Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 471; see also Lan Cao, Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning?, 32
TEX. INT’L L.J. 545, 549 (1997) (describing how modernization theory views development as a
sequential process similar to that experienced by the West).
18. Often “rule of law” is used synonymously with “law and development.” That is because
rule of law is the legal component of market development. Development increasingly means market development (or at least reliance on the market as an engine for growth and development) and
rule of law is the institution, at the very least, of laws that will support such market development
and, among other objectives, restrain arbitrary governmental actions. See, e.g. John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter? (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace,
Working Paper No. 26, 2002), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files /wp26.pdf;
Stephen Holmes, Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law?, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1999, at
68 (“Essentially, law is seen as a springboard to economic development,” and therefore efforts
have been devoted at providing a secure contracts and property framework in order to develop a
free market.).
19. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IRAQ: THE DAY AFTER (2003).
20. Shibley Telhami, Conflicting Views of Terrorism, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 581, 586 (2002).
21. Id. at 587.
22. Id. at 598.
23. Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror Without
the War, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 587, 599–600 (2004).
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and lack of free markets and stable financial institutions.”24
The idea that economic development is part of a wider political solution resonated after September 11 and was embraced not only by scholars25 but also by governments and aid agencies. At the highest level of
the U.S. government, officials such as then Secretary of State Colin
Powell drew the connection between the national security of the United
States and economic development of poor countries. As Secretary Powell put it, in considering the Bush Administration’s foreign policy record, there are “issues…that tend to dominate the headlines, and issues
of equal or greater long-term strategic significance that rarely generate
as much interest. Among these latter issues, none is more important than
economic development in the world’s poorest societies.”26 Although
poverty is not a direct cause of terrorism, “[p]overty breeds frustration
and resentment, which ideological entrepreneurs can turn into support
for—or acquiescence to—terrorism, particularly in those countries in
which poverty is coupled with a lack of political rights and basic freedoms.”27 According to Secretary Powell, “[d]evelopment is not a ‘soft’
policy issue, but a core national security issue,”28 and “[t]he United
States cannot win the war on terrorism unless we confront the social and
political roots of poverty.”29
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. actions have reflected the recognition
that “development, democracy, and security [are] inextricably linked.”30
The United States, for example, passed the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002 with new guidelines that require the Bank, in
determining whether to accept an application for credit from a foreign
nation, to take into consideration the cooperation of the host government in the fight against terrorism.31 The United States Agency for In24. Id. at 599.
25. See, e.g., Fandl, supra note 23, at 609 (“Eradicating poverty is the single most potent solution to the problem of terrorism.”); Oren Gross, Mending Walls: The Economic Aspects of Israeli-Palestinian Peace, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1539 (2000); Brink Lindsey, The Trade Front:
Combating Terrorism with Open Markets, TRADE POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 24 (CATO Inst. Center
for Trade Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.), August 5, 2003, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/
tpa-024.pdf (arguing that the United States should pursue a broad trade strategy as a component in
the war on terror); Telhami, supra note 20.
26. Colin L. Powell, No Country Left Behind, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 28.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–189, § 17, 116 Stat.
698, 706 (2002) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635); see also 148 CONG. REC. H1771, at H1786
(daily ed. May 1, 2002) (statement of Rep. J.C. Watts) (“[W]e must reach out to developing na-
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ternational Development (USAID), with a history of fighting poverty
long before September 11, now aims to have “a major role in minimizing the conditions that foster terrorism, instability, and other global
threats,” according to Deputy Assistant Administrator Gordon West.32
The United States National Security Strategy targets global economic
development as a key factor in enhancing national security,33 drawing an
explicit link between development and threat reduction.34
The National Security Strategy was implemented after a historic conference in Monterrey, Mexico. Six months after September 11, 2001, in
Monterrey, Mexico, at the United Nations Conference on Financing for
Development, the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO),
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private businesses reaffirmed the need to encourage private capital flows to poor countries in
order to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals, which includes the resolution “[t]o halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the
world’s people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger….”35 Part of the Monterrey
Consensus is that “[u]nderdevelopment and extreme poverty are breeding grounds for violence and despair, thus undermining peace and security for developed and developing countries alike.”36 Consequently,
President Bush pledged to raise American official development assistance progressively from 10 to 15 billion dollars, with assistance tied to
the recipients’ anti-terrorism record37 and with the establishment of a
new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).38 The MCA not only protions across the globe, often beset by forces of terror, and demonstrate how free markets, open
trade, and private enterprise under the rule of law can lead to prosperity for their citizens. Our
national security improves when global stability prevails.”).
32. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, USAID STRIVES TO MINIMIZE CONDITIONS THAT FOSTER
TERRORISM (2003), http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archieve/2004/Jan/06-495201.html.
33. Id.
34. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, iv-vi (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
35. Jens Martens, Global Development Cooperation After Monterrey, Results and Perspectives from the Financing for Development Process, at 1, 4, 7, available at http://www2
.weed-online.org/ffd/doc/martens-monterrey-results.rtf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
36. International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., Mar. 18–20,
2002, Report of the International Conference on Financing For Development, 82, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.198/11 (Mar. 22, 2002) (statement of Han Seung-soo, President of the General Assembly
of the United Nations).
37. Martens, supra note 35, at 6–7.
38. Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 156–57 (2004). On January 23, 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was signed into law. The MCC will administer the MCA. Initial funding for the
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motes the standard objectives favored by traditional development projects but also conditions financial disbursement on the recipient’s implementation of certain prerequisites.39
The United States is also promoting a trade agenda that is part of its
overall strategy for combating terrorism. In the immediate postSeptember 11 environment, then U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick described the Bush Administration’s trade agenda as one integral
to the country’s counteroffensive against terrorism. “Trade is about
more than economic efficiency. It promotes the values at the heart of
this protracted struggle.”40 The United States, for example, is pushing to
develop a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013.41
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, law and development has been resurrected and transformed from an important, but second-tier-level project to a critical component of the United States’ longterm anti-terrorism, national security strategy.42 Fighting terrorism now
includes at the forefront a focus on market and rule of law reform efforts long proposed by standard development scholars.43 What is still
missing is a concerted effort to address the cultural foundations without
which markets and rule of law projects are likely to fail.

B.

Development as Human Rights

Law and development remains a priority for traditional development
organizations such as the World Bank, as secure property and contract
rights are deemed necessary for the development of a robust, rule-bound
2004 fiscal year is $1 billion. Millennium Challenge Corp., MCC Accomplishments at Three,
http://www.mcc.gov/features/mccatthree/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); see also Editorial,
The President’s Millennium Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at 32 (hailing the MCA as “a
new approach to development aid that links American assistance to a poor country to its progress
in key areas”).
39. The MCC administers the MCA. Its board determines eligible countries, relying on sixteen indicators grouped into three categories. Under category one, “Ruling Justly,” the indicators
include “civil liberties,” “rule of law,” and “control of corruption.” Under category two, “Encouraging Economic Freedom,” the indicators include “country credit rating,” “fiscal policy,” “trade
policy,” and “days to start a business.” Id. Under category three, “Investing in People,” indicators
include “public expenditures on health as percent of GDP,” “public primary education as percent
of GDP,” and “immunization rates.” Millennium Challenge Corp., REPORT ON THE CRITERIA
AND METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT ASSISTANCE IN FY 2004, available at http://www.mcc.gov/
selection/reports/FY04_Criteria_Methodology.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
40. Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror with Trade, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A35.
41. Fandl, supra note 23, at 622; Lindsey, supra note 25, at 1.
42. See Thomas Carothers, The New Aid, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2002, at A19.
43. See generally id.

366

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 47:2

market.44 Even charitable NGOs such as Oxfam, which may disagree
about the appropriate strategies for market development and reforms,
generally acknowledge that a working market (and the rule of law necessary to support it) is imperative for poverty reduction.45 The UN,
which has traditionally been statist in orientation and suspicious of
global markets, now recognizes the need to engage the market and promote trade, through greater coordination with the WTO46 and the international business community.47 As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
remarked:
A fundamental shift has occurred in the UN-business relationship. The United Nations has developed a profound appreciation
for the role of the private sector, its expertise, its motivated spirit,
its unparalleled ability to create jobs and wealth…. In a world of
common challenges and common vulnerabilities, the United Nations and business are finding common ground.48
44. See Hewko, supra note 18, at 3; Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN
AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 95, 97 (“Basic elements of a modern market economy such as property
rights and contracts are founded on the law and require competent third-party enforcement. Without the rule of law, major economic institutions such as corporations, banks, and labor unions
would not function, and the government’s many involvements in the economy—regulatory
mechanisms, tax systems, customs structures, monetary policy, and the like—would be unfair,
inefficient, and opaque.”); Carothers, supra at 98 (“[E]conomic globalization is feeding the ruleof-law imperative by putting pressure on governments to offer the stability, transparency, and
accountability that international investors demand.”).
45. See OXFAM, A CASE FOR REFORM: FIFTY YEARS OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK 2
(1995).
There is today a growing consensus that markets have a critical role to play in development, and that chronic budget deficits and balance of payments deficits must be addressed. It is also recognized that, in the creation of the crisis of the 1980s, the impact of
external forces was compounded by internal factors, such as ill-conceived forms of State
intervention.
Id.
46. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, approved by the largest gathering of states
since the UN’s founding, aims for “greater policy coherence and better cooperation between the
United Nations, its agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization,
as well as other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving a fully coordinated approach to the
problems of peace and development.” United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, at
9, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/L.2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
47. At the 1999 World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, Secretary Annan promised that the United Nations would “make the case for and maintain an environment which favors
trade and open markets.” Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes, Labor Standards and Global Governance: Examining the Dimensions of Institutional Engagement, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 259,
266 (2000) (quoting Press Release, The Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in
Davos, U.N. Press Release No. SG/SM/6881/Rev.1 (Feb. 1, 1999)).
48. Kofi Annan, Message to the Business Humanitarian Forum (Jan. 27, 1999),
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Those enthusiastic about markets and the rule of law are now numerous and include entities that do not ordinarily form part of a common
alliance, such as development NGOs, businesses, human rights groups,
and the UN. This is partly because there is credible evidence to support
the notion that countries that have achieved a certain level of wealth—
an objective of development—are likely to have a good human rights
record as well. For example, an empirical study focusing on twelve
Asian countries shows that although there is wide variation among them
with respect to human rights and quality of life indicators, such as infant
mortality, life expectancy, expenditures on education and health, what is
most important in explaining differences in rights observance and quality of life is wealth.49 As the author of the study concluded, “In the subtle and complex interplay of economics, politics, culture, law and institutions in determining rights performance, what matters most is wealth.
Put bluntly, if somewhat too simply, if you want better performance
across a range of rights and indicators of human wellbeing, show me the
money.”50 This finding that wealth, one measure of economic development,51 correlates with an improvement in the protection of rights,
whether political or economic, has been duplicated and supported by
many other studies.52
A UN report shows that there is also a positive relationship between
wealth and women’s rights as measured by the UN Gender Development Index, which correlates almost perfectly with the Human Devel-

http://www.bhforum.ch/default.aspx?frame=/documentation/message_from_un_secretary_general
.htm.
49. Randall Peerenboom, Show Me the Money: The Dominance of Wealth in Determining
Rights Performance in Asia, 15 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 75 (2004).
50. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
51. Economic growth is not nor should it be the sole determinant of economic development.
One approach to development is to view it as
a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy…. Viewing development in
terms of expanding substantive freedoms directs attention to the ends that make development important, rather than merely to some of the means (for example, growth of the
GNP) that, inter alia, play a prominent part in the process.
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (Oxford 1999).
52. See, e.g., GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES,
BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 248, 251–53 (2d ed. 2001)
(finding that wealth mattered the most in terms of rights compliance); William H. Meyer, Human
Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 368, 393–94 (1996)
(showing that GNP is the biggest factor in countries’ observation of political, civil, social, and
economic rights); UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003,
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END POVERTY (2003),
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_complete.pdf.
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opment Index (HDI).53 Other studies have corroborated this result,
showing that a higher GDP is positively correlated with better observation of women’s rights.54 Moreover, a country’s economic development
correlates not only with rights observation but also with democracy.
Theorists who have studied the conditions necessary for democracy to
take root have noted a strong correlation between economic development and democracy,55 with the latter, in turn, providing more rights
protection than non-democracies.56 In fact, one could credibly argue that
economic development, in the long run, translates into better protection
for human rights than other indicators, such as ratification by states of
human rights treaties.57
53. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP GENDER-RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDEX
(2003), http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/pdf/hdr05_table_25.pdf. The HDI is a summary measure of human development. It measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: First, a “long and healthy life,” as measured by life expectancy
at birth; second, “knowledge,” as measured by the adult literacy rate (which accounts for twothirds of the score) and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment ratio (accounting for one-third of the score); and finally, a “decent” standard of living, as measured by
GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2006, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY, AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 263
(2006), http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf.
54. Clair Apodaca, Measuring Women’s Economic and Social Rights Achievement, 20 HUM.
RTS. Q. 139, 160 (1998).
55. For example, Seymour Martin Lipset noted that the most important variable that correlated with democracy was a basic level of economic development. See Seymour Martin Lipset,
The Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 69, 75 (1959). Lipset observed that the usual indices of economic development—
average wealth, degree of industrialization, education level—were higher in democratic countries
than non-democratic countries. Id. at 75–79. Others have noted that once democratization occurs,
it tends to survive in countries that have attained a certain minimum level of economic development, Adam Prezworksi & F. Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49 WORLD POLITICS
155, 165 (1997), or at least that once a more economically developed country democratizes, it is
more improbable that it will revert to authoritarianism. See Barbara Geddes, What Do We Know
About Democratization After Twenty Years?, 2 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115, 117–19 (1999); Peerenboom, supra note 49, at 100 (“Whether or not economic development is the cause of democratization, in the long term, economically advanced countries are likely to be, and to remain, democracies.”).
56. Sen has observed that “no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a
functioning democracy—be it economically rich (as in contemporary Western Europe or North
America) or relatively poor (as in postindependence India, or Botswana, or Zimbabwe).” SEN,
supra note 51, at 16.
57. See Linda C. Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE. RES. 95, 112 (1999)
(finding in a study of 178 countries from 1976 to 1998 that signing the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and even the Optional Protocol allowing individuals the right to initiate
complaints against a state did not cause the ratifying countries to alter their actual behavior, such
as to improve their human rights record); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941, 1978 (2002) (finding in a study of 166 countries that
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It is widely acknowledged that despite billions of dollars in aid spent
over the years, law and development has been characterized by more
failure than success.58 Considerable time and effort have been expended
in establishing a formal framework, focusing, for example, on issues related to the formal economy and the writing and enactment of formal
laws necessary to support it. Thus the “law” in “law and development”
has meant formal laws. The “development” in “law and development”
has meant, for the most part, the development of a functioning formal
economy. As observed by Tom Carothers, founder and co-director of the
Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the “Rule of Law Assistance Standard Menu,” as he
coined it, includes “reforming institutions” such as reform of the judiciary, the legislatures, the police and prison system, “rewriting laws,” including modernization of criminal and commercial laws, “upgrading the
legal profession through support for stronger bar associations and law
schools,” and “increasing legal access and advocacy.”59 The focus is
clearly on formal institutions and statutes.60
Simply speaking, these projects have not been enough but yet are repeated.61 There are several reasons why the current standard menu ofstates ratifying human rights treaties have only a slightly better compliance record than nonratifying countries, and that countries with the worst human rights records have higher rates of
ratification than countries with a better record).
58. See Carothers, supra note 44, at 96; Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Paper No. 28, 2002) (finding that efforts to free the judicial system in many Latin American countries of nepotism and corruption have failed) available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
files/wp28.pdf; Holmes, supra note 18, at 1 (“[Despite] a multimillion-dollar effort to promote
the ‘rule of law’ in the Russian Federation…[w]hat we have in Russia today, in short, is an incoherent state tenuously connected to a demoralized society. This pattern explains why there is little
of the rule of law, despite foreign efforts to promote it, and why the problems facing legaldevelopment programs seem so immense and intractable.”).
59. THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 165–168
(Carnegie Endowment 1999).
60. Carothers, supra note 44, at 99. Law and development assistance for the Russian Federation, for example, has a similar focus. Projects “include everything from study visits and continuing-education programs for judges to the coaching of court administrators in docket management
and the establishment of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms.” Holmes, supra note 18, at 1.
Others focus on “legal codification [and] the modernization of legal information systems…, [particularly] legislative drafting assistance in commercial-law areas, such as securities, bankruptcy,
corporate governance, and banking.” Id.
61. In evaluating judicial reform efforts, Tom Carothers has observed that aid advisors “seem
determined to repeat mistakes made in other places.” CAROTHERS, supra note 59, at 176;
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRUMPS IN THE WEST AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 12 (2000) (“Since the nineteenth century, nations have been copying
the laws of the West to give their citizens the institutional framework to produce wealth. They
continue to copy such laws today, and obviously it doesn’t work.”).
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fered by law and development assistance is off the mark. First, although
this formalistic approach emphasizing rule of law and market development is necessary, it is far from sufficient. Much more attention needs to
be paid to the non-law framework, norms,62 and culture that influence
the efficacy of formal laws. Second, the majority of the poor in developing countries live in a parallel, “extralegal” universe defined by informality.63 A call by the noted Peruvian economist, Hernando De Soto, to
address the informal sector—in brief, to discover “their informal norms
and arrangements” and “find ways to integrate them into the formal
property system”64—has already been proposed and I will not discuss it
here. Suffice it to say that De Soto does not place high hopes on the
drafting of new laws—often imposed by governments with the help of
foreign experts.65 As he puts it, “if lawyers want to play a role in creating good laws, they must step out of their law libraries into the extralegal sector….”66 Whether one agrees with De Soto’s recommendation to
study and formalize informal arrangements67 for the purpose of my Article, what is important is the fact that he goes beyond the usual law and
development emphasis on formal laws and rules to include the norms
and custom of the informal economic sector.
I would go further still. In Part II below, I examine the glaring gap in
law and development studies—a blind spot to culture, norms, and custom and how they influence a country’s laws and its economic development. The gap may be derived from an acultural framework law and
development inherited from international law generally; or from a general reluctance to touch culture because of a history of cultural imperialism and current sensitivities associated with it; or from the sense that
culture is hard to quantify and thus cannot be legislated into being the
ways laws and rules can.
62. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and the “Rule of Law”,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2275 (2003).
63. Hernando De Soto defines an extralegal system as one where many of the world’s poor
live and work—“outside the official law, using their own informally binding arrangements to protect and mobilize their assets.” DE SOTO, supra note 61, at 21.
64. Id. at 179.
65. Often, foreign development experts believe they’ve achieved great success if “their advice
is swallowed whole and the laws they draft are actually passed by parliament.” Holmes, supra
note 18, at 7. Yet this is often the case if the country at issue is one where formal laws are virtually unenforced.
66. DE SOTO, supra note 61, at 186–87.
67. For a critique of De Soto’s ideas, see for example Jonathan Manders, Sequencing Property Rights in the Context of Development: A Critique of the Writings of Hernando De Soto, 37
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 177 (2004).
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CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The term “culture” carries many meanings and has been subjected to
many definitions.68 As I am not an anthropologist, I use the term
loosely, so that a community’s culture means simply the “beliefs, preferences, and behaviors of its members, along with the mechanisms that
link these traits to one another.”69 Culture may be used in this sense “to
summarize the way in which groups distinguish themselves from other
groups”70 through “shared histories, traditions, values, and beliefs.”71
For the most part, international law, international relations, and law
and development have neglected to address culture.72 Some have suggested that international relations’ acultural stance may have to do with
the perception that culture is too imprecise a concept for analysis.73 This
bias against culture is compounded by international relations’ view of
itself as an empirical science grounded in facts, not values,74 and its
roots in the positivist tradition.75 Furthermore, the discipline adopts a
theoretical model that presents theories as being universally applicable
68. Two influential anthropologists have documented more than 161 formal definitions of
culture. ALFRED LOUIS KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOLN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS (1952). See also ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE
ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT 56 (1999), for select definitions: for example, “the total way of
life of a people”; “the social legacy the individual acquires from his group”; “a storehouse of
pooled learning”; “a set of standardized orientations to recurrent problems”; “a mechanism for the
normative regulation of behavior.”
69. Kuran, supra note 4, at 115, 117. One could call this a “thin” conception of culture—
encompassing only “subjective terms as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying
assumptions prevalent among people in a society.” Samuel P. Huntington, Foreword: Cultures
Count, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at xv. By contrast, the noted anthropologist Clifford
Geertz, it has been said, subscribes to a “thick description” of culture, using it “to refer to the entire way of life of a society: its values, practices, symbols, institutions, and human relationships.”
Id.
70. Jacinta O’Hagan, Re-framing International Law for the 21st Century: Conflict, Convergence or Co-existence? The Relevance of Culture in Reframing World Order, 9 TRANSNAT’L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 537, 538 (1999).
71. Id. at 539. Despite the ethnic and religious differences among European countries, one
might observe that “[t]he expansion of the West, as a civilization, has been one of the most significant features of this millennium.” Id. at 541.
72. See infra notes 73–91 and accompanying text.
73. Philip Darby & Albert Paolini, Bridging International Relations and Post-Colonialism, 19
ALTERNATIVES 371, 382 (1994); R.B.J. Walker, The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations, in CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 7–8 (Jongsuk Chay ed., 1990).
74. HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE 3 (3d ed. 1964); see also Stanley Hoffmann, An American Social Science: International
Relations, 106 DAEDALUS 41 (1977).
75. Robert Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379
(1988); Dominique Jacquin et al., Culture in International Relations: An Introduction to the Special Issue, 22 MILLENNIUM 375, 375 (1993).
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and proposes rules that are to be universally appropriate, transcending
local or cultural differences.76 For example, states are presumed to act in
a certain culture-neutral way while in pursuit of power and security.77
International law too tends to insist that its rules are universally valid,
in other words, “that a body of doctrine, a common history, a common
cosmopolitan ‘college’ of international legal colleagues, a common language, bind international lawyers to one another across different national cultures or legal traditions….”78 Indeed, international law,
whether “public” or “private,”79 generally aims for universality, not difference—and a focus on culture usually tends to highlight differences80
that are problematic to the objective of the discipline—“to empower an
international public order above the nation, an international private order below or outside the state, or a complex regime of transnational order.”81
76. Robert Cox, Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory, 10 MILLENNIUM 126, 132 (1981); Richard Ashley, The Poverty of Neo-Realism, 38 INT’L
ORG. 225, 286 (1984); Barry Buzan, The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?, in INTERNATIONAL
THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND (Smith et al. eds., 1996).
77. KENNETH WALTZ, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 80 (1979). For the view
that international relations is not culture neutral but instead rooted in Western culture, see Richard
Falk, Culture, Modernism, Postmodernism: A Challenge to International Relations, in CULTURE
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 267, 268 (Jongsuk Chay ed., 1990); David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9, 118 (1999) (“The insistence on
the universality of international law often denied the roots of international law in Western projects of conquest and understated the obvious density of legal and political relations within cultural, economic, or ideological blocs.”).
78. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 17.
79. For a critique bemoaning the false dichotomy between “public” and “private” international law, see Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic Development, 32
TEX. INT’L L.J. 209, 222–33 (1997).
80. In contrast to international law, for example, comparative law specializes in differences.
81. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 62. Internationalists ignore culture also because it “may break
the internationalist frame in two related ways: by generating solidarities which cross the neat
boundaries of nation-states or by empowering smaller entities within states to erupt into international consciousness.” Id. at 63. For a discussion of international law’s marginalization of culture,
see id. at 62–69, 66 (describing how international law’s approach to dealing with culture is “to
render cultural differences internal to the sovereign form, outside the arena of international governance, as local matters of politics or culture”); id. at 85 (“governance is international while culture is local”); id at 86 (“service of the disciplinary desire carries with it an erasure of particularist
projects, sands them down, harnesses them to a universal project”); id. at 98 (international law
considers itself a cosmopolitan project, “more universal, rational, pragmatic, and expert than what
goes on nationally or locally. Brussels is better than Bonn and Bonn is better than Bremen. The
International Monetary Fund is better than the Russian Central Bank as that Bank is better than
the government budgetary process in Uzbekistan…. [T]he international is agnostic about how one
conducts oneself at home—international law bridges between states by providing a space above
cultural differences.”); id. at 126 (for international law, “culture [is] a set of local or particularist
commitments, a different language altogether from the communicative methods of cosmopolitan
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Public international law is statist in orientation82 and prefers to deal
with states, governments, and other sovereignty-related issues, relegating culture to the side.83 Private international law, or international economic law,84 deals with nonstate—specifically market—actors and aims
to protect normal market activities from the irrationality of culture.85
Private international law has aimed to construct an international liberal
regime of WTO rules to transcend the prejudices of the local.86 Indeed,
the often vehement opposition to globalization87 may be understood in
part as a reaction against the universalist claims of internationalism and
a defense of local cultures.88 Opposition to private international law and
governance”); id. at 127 (“[C]osmopolitanism…needs to be defended against outbreaks of more
primitive sensibilities when those sensibilities challenge the possibility of a universal pragmatism,
and to be more tolerant of diverse cultural differences when they do not threaten that hegemony…. Where this line should be drawn remains…a matter of controversy, but the frame is stable:
culture can be managed by exclusion or assimilation.”); id. at 127 (international “cosmopolitanism is not itself a culture, but comes after culture, emerges from the defeat of the particularism of
culture, and must be ‘tolerant’ of cultural differences…, precisely to retain distance from the cultural”).
82. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 44 (“Whatever its various qualifications, public international
law still begins with sovereign states…. The job of public international law is to bring governance
to sovereign….”).
83. See supra notes 72–82.
84. As used in the United States, “private international law” is concerned with international
business transactions and related commercial and trade matters. Joel Richard Paul, The Isolation
of Private International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 149, 151 n.4; Kennedy, supra note 77, at 38–39.
85. See, e.g., Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 2, 80 (2000) (“The whole legal structure of the free trade norm rests on a rational economic
model…. Cultural claims threaten that rationality argument.”).
86. Commentators have described the rise of international economic arbitration as the attempt
by private international law to develop “in appropriate cases, a jus gentium or lex mercatoria of a
new type, free of the contingencies and prejudices which dominate the scene in the various
States.” RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1985). “[W]hen parties request that arbitrators adjudicate their dispute in accordance with international law or with the
general principles of law, their intention is to escape from the national systems of law.” Id. at
350–51.
For example, Article 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) “creates a
binding, supranational arbitration scheme accessible directly by private business parties through
which businesses may overturn final anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions of domestic
trade regulators.” G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 887 (1995). Similarly, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, creates a system where domestic courts of signatory countries are bound, subject only to a
minimal “public policy” exception, to enforce arbitration decisions rendered by private international commercial arbitrators.
87. I have elsewhere characterized globalization as a “hyper state of internationalization.”
Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking U.S. Trade
Laws,,90 CAL. L. REV. 402, 415 (2002).
88. Nationalists opposed to the universalist and homogenizing inclinations of international
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to what critics view as its agenda—globalization of markets—has been
increasingly staked on cultural grounds.89 Private international law,
however, continues to maintain an international economic system
oblivious to cultural particularities.90
However, in recent years, culture has been injected into the national
and international mainstream due to certain political and intellectual developments. The end of the Cold War meant a surge in identity politics91
both at the subnational and transnational level.92 An intellectual interest
in identity and culture issues has accompanied this political shift as
well, with some scholars seeing a cultural world order of increased cohesion within and clashes among civilizational groups93 and with others
anticipating modernization and convergence along a Western, liberal
model.94
law stake their claims on national and local projects that speak the people’s language: “the emotionalism, the vulgar populism, the highly-colored romanticism of most national ideology (all the
things intellectuals have always held their noses at.).” TOM NAIRN, THE BREAK-UP OF BRITAIN
354 (2d exp. ed. 1977).
89. See Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Democracy Should Not Have Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 589, 592 (2000) (describing economic internationalism as being devoid of “any conception of a world beyond the market—the political or civic or cultural world in which ideas, beliefs,
traditions, even innovations have meaning beyond their salability”); Robert Wolf, The Regionalist
Answer, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 610, 621 (2000) (describing “globalization of world trade and
culture [as] a process of homogenization which an increasing number of people perceive as soulless and dehumanizing” and decrying “world-wide monoculture now being created by the corporations”).
90. See generally Paul, supra note 85, at 2 (discussing efforts to seek cultural exceptions to
free trade rules—for example, Europe’s call for exemption from trade rules prohibiting barriers to
the importation of American films, music, and television because American culture may overwhelm local European cultures; such claims are generally rejected).
91. Culture is necessarily implicated in identity politics. There are many definitions of culture, see supra note 68. One definition focuses on identity: “[c]ulture is concerned with identity,
aspiration, symbolic exchange, coordination, and structures and practices that serve relational
ends, such as ethnicity ritual, heritage, norms, meanings, and beliefs.” Vijayendra Rao & Michael
Walton, Culture and Public Action: Relationality, Equality of Agency, and Development, in
CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, supra note 4, at 4. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 111 (referring to
the end of the Cold War as unleashing “outbreaks of primitive or pre-ideological cultural passions
frozen by the Cold War”).
92. Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and
Practice, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 362 (1996) (“The term nation or tribe suggests an affinity group
that has placed certain values high on its agenda: shared genealogical origins, language and historic myths, as well as cultural and, perhaps, religious compatibility.”).
93. Huntington, supra note 69. In a similar vein, in contemporary, post-Cold War world politics, a heightened sense of cultural awareness and identity has resulted in ethnic turbulence in
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Chechnya, expressed not just in terms of national ethnic identity (Kosovar,
Bosnian, Chechnyan), but also civilizational identity (Slavic, Orthodox, Islamic). O’Hagan, supra
note 70, at 553, 560.
94. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN iv, xv, 77 (1992) (“All
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Generally speaking, however, international law remains ambivalent
about engaging culture directly despite the recent surge in identity politics. There are at least two reasons for this continued ambivalence. First,
while nationalism is associated with particularism, such as language,
ethnicity, religion, or culture,95 internationalism disassociates itself from
“particularism and parochialism” and is instead allied with “universalism and cosmopolitan sophistication.”96 When faced with particularistic
claims, international law has sought to develop a framework to harness
or contain them, for example, by recognizing the right of a “people” to
self-determination and by implication their own nation-state,97 or the
right of a culture to self-determination and by implication to be left
alone within their own self-defined borders. International law, in other
words, sidesteps cultural issues and, having endowed culture with the
right to self-determination, abstains from any claim to engage with or
influence its development within any defined community.
Second, international law has for years been in the strange position of
having to defend itself as worthy of being considered “real law,”98 wrestling with the perpetual question of “is international law, law,”99 and
thus is interested, even if claiming not to be, in proving to other disciplines that it too has all the usual attributes of law. Although international lawyers have emphasized that centralized enforcement is not escountries undergoing economic modernization must increasingly resemble one another,” as such
changes wrought by modernization “blur the boundaries between civilizations and promote a homogeneous set of political and economic institutions among the world’s most advanced countries.”) Id. at xv; see also Michael Mazarr, Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay,
19 WASH. Q., Spring 1996, at 177, 178 (discussing how cultural clashes are part of the transition
undergone by countries moving from one stage of economic development to another).
95. Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 7, 10
(1995).
96. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Nationalism Versus Internationalism: Another Look, 26
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 585, 585 (1994). See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
97. Cao, supra note 87, at 411–12 n.32.
98. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that international law is not real law because of the absence of a “unifying rule of recognition” and “secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislatures and courts…”).
99. See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the
TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 837 n.43 (2003) (“The organizing inquiry of
international law is ‘is international law law?’”); Ruti Teitel, The Future of Human Rights Discourse, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 449, 459 n.47 (2002) (addressing the positive/natural law debate in
international law, “namely framing the question: to what extent is international law, law?”). The
question endures because critics are not convinced that international law, without strong enforcement mechanisms, can qualify as law. International lawyers have thus spent considerable time
and energy defending the field. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND
FOREIGN POLICY 13–27 (2d ed. 1979); J.L. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 5
(1944).
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sential to a determination of whether something is or is not law, pointing
to international law’s compliance features instead,100 they have also
worked to make international law more like domestic law by strengthening international law’s enforcement features.101 In that respect, international law has shored up its positive law aspects and neglected to consider seriously the “soft” law attributes of the discipline—norms and
custom (the ingredients of culture in the sense used in this Article)—
even while, ironically, scholars in the domestic law area are increasingly
exploring their significance.102
Similarly, culture remains a non-issue in law and development, as the
discipline is intransigently law-centered.103 My critique of the tradition
of law and development follows in Part III.

III. LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT
A.

A Cautionary Tale

At the risk of overgeneralizing, most law and development scholars
come from an international law tradition that is, in the United States at
least, part of a liberal framework of cosmopolitanism.104 Unlike the nationalist whose primary identification is with his or her nation, the cosmopolitan’s “allegiance is to the worldwide community of human be-

100. Lori F. Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269
REC. DES COURS 9, 19–24 (1997) (discussing how international law is in fact enforced in different ways); Detlev F. Vagts, United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J.
INT’L L. 313, 323–29 (exploring five possible grounds for compliance by countries of their treaty
obligations).
101. The desire to be more like domestic law has meant crafting strong enforcement mechanisms, such as creating ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Courts,
and the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization.
102. I have elsewhere written about the powerful impact community norms play in facilitating the production of social capital and the conversion of such social capital into economic capital. See Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, supra note 1. For a discussion of norms and
their interaction with law, see id. at 864–74.
103. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 2071 (describing the core attributes of legal
liberalism in highly law-centered ways).
104. See Kennedy, supra note 77, at 23 (“International law in the United States after 1945
provided a congenial intellectual home for a large number of immigrants, among them European
and Jewish refugees, whose American patriotism was cosmopolitan rather than jingoistic and who
have been among the field’s strongest intellectual leaders.”); id. at 11 (“Legal internationalists in
the United States for most of the last 50 years have linked their status to the reputational ups and
downs of a broadly liberal cosmopolitanism….”); Slaughter Burley, supra note 96, at 585; see
also supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
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ings.”105 The cosmopolitan tends to
hold to a vision that accepts, even celebrates, the diversity of social and political systems in the world, taking pleasure in the existence and the products of peoples and places other than our
own homes. Thus, what is distinctive about cosmopolitans is that
we display our concern for our fellow humans without demanding of them that they become like ourselves.106
Law and development scholars steeped in the international cosmopolitan tradition are passionate about alleviating poverty in poor countries
but reluctant to tinker with or condemn norms or cultural attributes that
impede economic progress.
After Vietnam, as skepticism about American power and motives
rose, so did “loss of faith in liberal legalism as a picture of United States
society” or “doubts about the universality or desirability of the American experience.”107 Indeed, law and development scholars became vocal
in their charges that the movement was ethnocentric and naïve,108 and as
some adopted the perspective of the critical legal studies movement
(CLS), denounced the liberal legal paradigm they had favored as “inherently problematic.”109
Thus, there are two strands in law and development: first, an international cosmopolitanism that celebrates cultural diversity and loathes to
criticize or be perceived as criticizing any particular culture, and second,
a CLS inclination that is both appropriately critical of the failed promises of the liberal law and development model and also devoid of practical alternatives. Add to this mix an awareness among these scholars of
colonial history and the concomitant Orientalist tradition of defining the
colonizing West as the privileged “self” against which the colonized
Orient (or Third World), the “other,” is to be contrasted against and improved upon.110
105. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY 4
(Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
106. Kwame Anthony Appiah, The University in an Age of Globalization, Lecture at the
Princeton-Oxford Conference on Globalization at Oxford University (June 2002), quoted in
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, The International Dimension of the Law School Curriculum, 22
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 417, 419 n.4 (2004).
107. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 1089.
108. Id. at 1080.
109. Id. at 1099. For a critique of this shift in law and development, see Brian Z. Tamanaha,
Law and Development, 898 AM. J. INT’L L. 470, 474–75 (1995).
110. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978); see also Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and
Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 210 (2001) (describing the
“impulse to universalize Eurocentric norms and values by repudiating, demonizing, and ‘other-
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For the West, the Orient, according to the noted scholar Edward Said,
is not a geography but a European creation and Orientalism the “enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to
manage, even produce, the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily,
ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the postEnlightenment period.”111 Notable Western scholars have engaged in
Orientalism, suggesting, for example, that the Orient (and its equivalent)
is frozen in time and incapable of progress or change,112 whereas by implication the West is dynamic and progressive. For change to occur, the
impetus must come from Europe, even if via the shock of colonial encounter.113 Similar denunciations include the charge that the “Orient”
(China in particular) is incomprehensible (or inscrutable),114 illogical
ing’ that which is different and non-European”). Note that Orientalism is not limited to the “Orient” but extends to other locales as well. DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE:
POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 27 (2000) (“‘Europe’ remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call ‘Indian,’ ‘Chinese,’ ‘Kenyan,’ and so on.”).
111. SAID, supra note 110, at 3. Note that although the United States usually equates East
Asia (China, Japan, for example) with the “Orient,” Said’s use of the word “Orient” is derived
from a European understanding of the word and thus focuses on the Middle East.
112. Hegel, for example, declared that:
Early do we see China advancing to the condition in which it is found at this day, for as
the contrast between objective existence and subjective freedom of movement within it,
is still wanting, every change is excluded, and the fixedness of character which recurs
perpetually takes the place of what we should call the truly historical.
GEORG WILHELM HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 116 (J. Sibree trans., Dover 1956). Weber too wrote that “Chinese intellectual life remained completely static, and despite seemingly
favorable conditions modern capitalism simply did not appear.” MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF
CHINA 55 (Hans H. Gerth trans., Free Press 1951). Marx made a similar observation about China:
Its “isolation having come to a violent end by the medium of England, dissolution must follow as
surely as that of any mummy carefully preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin, whenever it is
brought into contact with the open air.” KARL MARX, MARX ON CHINA, 1853–1860: ARTICLES
FROM THE NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE 4 (Dona Torr ed., 1951). Maine also described “the East”
as static: in “those great and unexplored regions which we vaguely term the East…the distinction
between the Present and the Past disappears.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, VILLAGE COMMUNITIES
IN THE EAST AND WEST 7 (John Murray, 2d ed. 1872). Nietzsche described China as a “country
in which large-scale dissatisfaction and the capacity for change have become extinct centuries
ago.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 99 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Random House
1974) (1887); see also Edward H. Parker, The Principles of Chinese Law and Equity, 22 L.Q.
REV. 190, 209 (1906) (stating that China is nothing more than a “monotonous history”).
113. Karl Marx, The Future Results of British Rule in India, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER
659 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978) (describing the two functions of colonial rule, “one destructive,
the other generating, the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the lying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia”).
114. Foucault wrote the following of China: “at the other extremity of the earth we inhabit, a
culture devoted entirely to the ordering of space, but one that does not distribute the multiplicity
of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and
think.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS, at xix (1993). Hegel described China as “a
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and developmentally stunted,115 with “laws”116 that are equally static
and unchangeable.117 Assuming modernization is even possible under
those circumstances, it would have to culminate in a Europeanized
one.118
Given the awareness among most law and development scholars of
this history, it is no wonder that many are uncomfortable with the project they have embarked upon as privileged subjects, often Westerneducated experts, working to develop or modernize the object of their
project, the primitive Third World. Indeed, there may very well be a
whiff of Orientalism in the very objectives and assumptions of law and
development itself. Referring to China specifically, although his observations are equally applicable to other developing countries, the historian Paul Cohen noted that there is a tendency for the West to play
“Beauty to China’s Beast, transforming by its kiss the torpor of centuries, releasing with its magical power the potential for ‘development’
that must otherwise remain forever locked up.”119
My proposal to go beyond law and modernizing law to culture and
culture change will undoubtedly smack some of Orientalism. If even legal liberalism—instituting laws to support a liberal market society—
may be suspect for some law and development scholars, then certainly
“cultural liberalism” promoting cultural attributes that would facilitate
the establishment of a liberal market society would be as well, or even
more so.120
Indeed, until recently, even in disciplines other than international relations and international law, culture is irrelevant or marginalized: it can
dull half-conscious brooding spirit.” HEGEL, supra note 112, at 142.
115. WEBER, supra note 112, at 125 (charging that the Chinese writing system, by ideographic or pictorial representation, has led to unfortunate results: “The power of logos, of defining and reasoning, has not been accessible to the Chinese,” so that “[t]he very concept of logic
[has] remained absolutely alien” to them.).
116. For an examination of how the West has characterized Chinese law as “not law,” see
Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
117. Edward Harper Parker, Comparative Chinese Family Law, 8 CHINA REV. 67, 69 (1879)
(stating that to study Chinese law is to study “a living past, and converse with fossil men”).
118. HEGEL, supra note 112, at 116 (“The history of the world travels from East to West, for
Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning.”).
119. PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN CHINA: AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITINGS
ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST 151 (1984).
120. Promoting culture change may even be viewed as forcing Western culture on others
while simultaneously denying that this is in fact the agenda. See RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF
CULTURE 6 (1952) (The “world-wide…diffusion of [Western culture] has protected us as man had
never been protected before from having to take seriously the civilizations of other peoples; it has
given to our culture a massive universality that we have long ceased to account for historically,
and which we read off rather as necessary and inevitable.”).
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be described, compared, and appreciated, but not critically appraised.
For example, culture is a non-issue in economics because economists
generally believe that the right economic policy will produce the desired
economic result without regard to culture. Moreover, culture is an uncomfortable realm for economists to operate in, perhaps because “it presents definitional problems, is difficult to quantify, and operates in a
highly complex context with psychological, institutional, political, geographic, and other factors.”121 By contrast, anthropologists study cultures but are often unwilling to evaluate cultural norms and practices of
another society.122 As a noted sociologist observed,
In the humanities and liberal circles generally, a rigid orthodoxy
now prevails that can be summarized as follows: Culture is a
symbolic system to be interpreted, understood, discussed, delineated, respected, and celebrated as the distinctive product of a particular group of people, of equal worth with all other such products. But it should never be used to explain anything about the
people who produced it.123
Other reasons why cultural explanations may be disfavored in certain
intellectual circles include concerns about cultural determinism,124 that
is, relying on culture as an “over-determining”125 factor, the possible
misuse of culture “by reactionary analysts and public figures” as a way
to “blame the victim”126 or to avoid examining structural causes of pov121. Lawrence E. Harrison, Introduction: Why Culture Matters, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at xxv.
122. See, e.g., Richard A. Shweder, Moral Maps, “First World” Conceits, and the New
Evangelists, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 160 (“[T]he assertion that ‘culture matters’ is
a way of saying that some cultures are impoverished or backward, whereas others are enriched or
advanced.”). In a similar vein, in 1947, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological
Association declined to endorse the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights because it viewed the Declaration as ethnocentric. Huntington, supra note 69, at xxvi.
123. Orlando Patterson, Taking Culture Seriously: A Framework and an Afro-American Illustration, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 202–03.
124. Sen, supra note 5, at 46–50 (criticizing cultural comparisons between Ghana and South
Korea as an example of cultural determinism because such comparisons often ignore other differences: class, politics, the educational system, the relationship Korea had with Japan and the
United States, etc.); id. at 38 (criticizing the belief by some that “the fates of countries are effectively sealed by the nature of their respective cultures”) (emphasis in original).
125. Patterson, supra note 123, at 203. This means relying on a “simplistic or untenable conception of culture” and using it “in a crudely deterministic way” to explain certain groups’ problems, so that culture is viewed as “a fixed, explanatory black box invoked to explain anything and
everything about the group.” Id. In contrast, Professor Sen favors a different approach, “[c]ultural
interrelations within a broad framework,” in which “culture, seen in a dynamic and interactive
way, is one important influence among many others.” Sen, supra note 5, at 52, 55.
126. Patterson, supra note 123, at 204. Professor Patterson rejects the argument that cultural
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erty,127 and the desire to promote cultural diversity and ethnic pride.128
Thus, the following statement is an accurate description of the ambiguous role ascribed to culture: “We all realize that before we resort to culture today to explain the differences in economic progress or political
attitudes among nations and ethnic groups, we prefer to find other explanations.”129
Despite a general reluctance to study and appraise culture, increasingly, it is being recognized in one way or another as an important factor
in economic development and in related areas.130 In fact, some have asserted that culture plays a primary role, “culture makes almost all the
difference. Witness the enterprise of expatriate minorities—the Chinese
in East and Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, Jews and Calvinists throughout much of Europe, and on and on.”131
Others acknowledge the link between cultural influences and economic
explanations amount to blaming the victim. If a person who has low self-esteem and behaves in
self-defeating ways as a result of having been abused is told by someone to go to a psychologist
to seek therapy, “[i]t would be absurd to accuse that person of blaming the victim. Yet this is exactly what happens when a sympathetic analysis is condemned for even hinting that some AfroAmerican problems may be the tragic consequences of their cultural adaptation to an abusive
past.” Id.
127. Id.; see also Rao & Walton, supra note 91, at 10.
128. Patterson, supra note 123, at 204.
129. Nathan Glazer, Disaggregating Culture, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 220.
130. Multi-country studies have revealed cultural or regional differences in rights observation. See Layna Mosley & Saika Uno, Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Foreign Direct Investment and Human Rights, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, Boston, Aug. 28–Sept. 1, 2002, http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/
papers/045/045008WayLucan.pdf (finding a correlation between regions and labor rights, with
the Asian and Pacific regions not as supportive of labor rights as Europe, though more protective
than the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America). There is also a differentiation as to
women’s rights, see Clair Apodaca, Measuring Women’s Economic and Social Rights Achievement, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 139, 163–65 (1998) (showing that regional differences in women’s rights
may be explained by “culturally specific attitudes towards women’s status, developed under differing historical and economic conditions.”); and rule of law and good governance, see Amir
Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance
(November 22, 2004) (showing linkage between culture and adherence to good governance
norms, with cultures that emphasize individual autonomy and egalitarianism scoring better generally).
131. David Landes, Culture Makes Almost All the Difference, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra
note 3, at 2. See generally DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS (1999). I
have elsewhere examined the market dominance of certain ethnic groups, some recent immigrants
in the United States and other countries, and other historical “middlemen minorities” throughout
the world. See Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale? 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1521 (2003); see also AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (2003) (describing the market dominance of ethnic minorities such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Jews in Russia, and the Ibos
in Africa). For a review of Chua’s book, see Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Development, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1044 (2004).
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success132 even as they caution that a cultural exploration must be balanced and examined “within a broad framework,”133 so that we neither
neglect culture nor privilege it “in stationary and isolated terms.”134

B.

A Brief Look at Markets and Culture

As culture scholars have observed, “culture is not an independent
variable. It is influenced by numerous other factors, for example, geography and climate, politics, the vagaries of history.”135 Culture influences institutions even more strongly, “culture is the mother
and…institutions are the children,”136 or vice versa. For example, according to the noted Jamaican-born sociologist, Professor Orlando Patterson, Afro-American cultural models of “compensatory sexuality” and
“unsecured paternity,”137 celebrating early marriage and high fertility,
had roots in the economic institutions of slavery and sharecropping.
Similarly, even though the Japanese insist that eating whale meat has
deep cultural significance, and thus they should be exempt from the international ban on whaling,138 this cultural preference has economic
132. Sen, supra note 5, at 40.
133. Id. at 52.
134. Id. Professor Sen warned against seeing culture as all-determining, cautioning that Max
Weber had claimed that Confucianism did not promote rational instrumentalism and was unsuitable for an industrial economy. Id. at 48.
135. Harrison, Why Culture Matters, supra note 121, at xxviii; see also JARED DIAMOND,
GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL 417–18 (1997) (“[C]ultural factors and influences…loom large….
Some of that cultural variation is no doubt a product of environmental variation…. A minor cultural factor may arise for trivial, temporary local reasons, become fixed, and then predispose a
society toward more important cultural choices….”).
136. Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?, in
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 75; see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 117 (1990). In explaining the different
developments that have taken root in the former colonies of Britain and Spain in the Americas,
North noted that “[i]n the former, an institutional framework has evolved that permits the complex impersonal exchange necessary to political stability and to capture the potential economic
gains of modern technology. In the latter, personalistic relationships are still key to much of the
political and economic exchange.”
Similarly,
[a]lthough formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are
much more impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural constraints not only connect the past with the present and future, but provide us with a key to explaining the
path of historical change.
Id. at 6.
137. Patterson, supra note 123, at 212.
138. In 1982, the International Whaling Commission adopted a moratorium on whaling. Japan was one of the few countries that opposed the ban. See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Thirty-fourth
Report of the Int’l Whaling Comm’n, at 1 (1982).

2007]

CULTURE CHANGE

383

roots in the postwar period, when non-whale protein sources were
scarce and the Japanese began to rely on whale meat for school
lunches.139 In a similar vein, Japan’s lifetime employment system and its
high savings rate, generally deemed to be an essential component of the
country’s cultural characteristics, came out of the post-World War II experience; lifetime employment was instituted to control labor strife,
while first-hand experiences of deprivation and shortages led to a general practice of saving.140 “Thus it is difficult to disentangle culturally
derived behaviors from behaviors that have been enhanced or encouraged by the economic system.”141
Although development policy has emphasized formal laws and formal institutions,142 Douglass North’s work defines institutions broadly,
as the “rules of the game in a society or, more formally,…the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction,”143 thus making room
for culture. North suggests that informal constraints, derived “from socially transmitted information [that is] a part of the heritage that we call
culture,” can have a profound impact on institutional development.144
Such informal constraints are part of the “governing structure,” “codes
of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions” that shape our “daily
interaction with others, whether within the family, in external social relations, or in business activities.”145 In this respect, “[c]ultural norms
and beliefs can be seen as the deepest level of institution, and thus the
same framework can illuminate the role of cultural differences in economic performance.”146 Rather than study only formal institutions and
139. Suvendrini Kakuchi, Tokyo Persists with Bid to Lift Whaling Ban, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Nov. 13, 1997.
140. Michael Porter, Attitudes, Values, Beliefs, and the Microeconomics of Prosperity, in
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 24.
141. Id..
142. See supra notes 59–68 and accompanying text.
143. NORTH, supra note 136, at 3.
144. Id. at 37. For a discussion of new institutional economics and how different types of institutional arrangements or governance structure will play a part in determining the cost and benefit associated with the transaction, see Cao, supra note 1, at 865 n.86.
145. NORTH, supra note 136, at 36.
146. Christopher Clague & Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Preface to 573 ANNALS 8, 10
(JAN. 2001) (citations omitted). For an example of the relationship between culture and informal
institutions, information transmission and economic development, see, e.g., Clifford Geertz, The
Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 28 (1978).
Others have studied how informal institutions, including cultural norms and practices, may be
adapted to cope with problems of coordination and information asymmetry. See Karla Hoff &
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction: Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets—Puzzles and
Policy Perspectives, 4 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 235, 243 (1990) (discussing an indigenous solution to an imperfect legal system, the “usufruct loan” allowing the lender to occupy and use the
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laws and how to change them, North has focused on informal institutions, cultural norms and practices and whether they present informal
constraints to the achievement of economic objectives. The question is
whether such informal constraints, if they exist, can be transformed.147
There are many instances in which such efforts have been attempted,
historically and currently. For example, scholars have found that the
vast cultural differences between the Italian North and South, and the
pervasive lack of trust manifested in the latter, are a contributing factor
to the economic discrepancy between the two regions.148 At the same
time, they have observed that Italy’s efforts to decentralize public policy
and administration and promote civil society in the 1970s were key to
the successful advancement of trust in the South and consequently relatively efficient economic exchanges.149 In other words, culture may be
influenced by a combination of many factors, including the type of policies and institutions put in place, as well as historical, economic and political circumstances.
A culture change project should be considered if certain cultural attributes are “harmful to economic productivity.”150 For example, regimes committed to Islamization, or Islamic economics, ban interest because they believe devout Muslims must resist Mammon—the evils
flowing from immoral economic gain.151 Even assuming this practice
enjoys real support on cultural or religious grounds,152 banning interest
borrower’s land during the term of the loan); Karla Hoff and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Modern Economic Theory and Development, in FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THE FUTURE IN
PERSPECTIVE 389 (Gerald M. Meier & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2000).
147. In reference to a cultural model in the black community that does not condemn early
marriage or high birth rates, Professor Patterson also cautioned that this model is not static because “although cultural continuities certainly exist, people are not slaves to them. They use them
and they can change them if they really want to.” Patterson, supra note 123, at 218; see also Rao
& Walton, supra note 91, at 17.
148. See, e.g., ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY (1993). Putnam found that civic culture made all the difference in Northern Italy,
where networks of associations and ties and the norms of trust they produce and sustain helped
overcome collective action problems and made individuals and groups more productive. Id. at
182. See also EDWARD BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY 85 (1958) (describing the people of the Montegrano district in southern Italy as subscribing to a norm of
“amoral familism” whereby one should “[m]aximize the material, short-run advantage of nuclear
family; assume that all others will do likewise”); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 345–46 (2000).
149. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 148; FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST
97-111 (1995).
150. Kuran, supra note 4, at 120.
151. TIMUR KURAN, ISLAM & MAMMON: THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS OF ISLAMISM, at
ix (2004).
152. TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES 230 (1995) (discussing “cultural prefer-
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has economic consequences. Certainly equity-based and interest-free financial instruments serve a useful economic purpose;153 however, it
does not follow that interest-bearing lending should be banned on economic grounds.
The ban on interest was imposed fourteen centuries ago on an agrarian and nomadic economy, perhaps due to Islam’s prohibition of an ancient Arabian practice whereby defaulting debtors were penalized by
having their debt doubled and redoubled, resulting in the enslavement of
many poor people.154 More than sixty countries now have Islamic banks
that do not offer or charge interest and some among them, Pakistan and
Iran, outlaw interest, forcing even foreign subsidiaries to adopt Islamic
methods of deposit taking and lending.155 But from an economic standpoint, the ban is unnecessary because of vastly different conditions that
exist in today’s economy. For example, instead of enslavement, we have
bankruptcy laws. The ban is not only anachronistic but also economically detrimental. Given the fact that interest plays a central role in the
modern economy, shunning interest is likely to mean non-participation
in the global economic system156 and prohibitions on economic arrangements such as mortgages, credit cards, currency hedging or futures
contracts.157 An interest ban is also damaging because it is economically
inefficient. The ban prohibits people from making choices about the degree of risks they are willing to take, forcing people to engage in “timeconsuming stratagems to disguise interest charges…, [raising] the costs
of negotiating and monitoring financial agreements.”158 When viewed
ence falsification” by the public); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 903, 929, 937 (1996).
153. Kuran, supra note 4, at 123. Proponents of Islamic banking argue that by forcing financiers to invest directly in a venture, rather than merely charge interest for the capital loaned, the
system encourages more prudent lending and prevents “future Enrons and Argentina,” presumably because everyone would have to spend within his or her means. Jerry Useem, Banking on Allah, FORTUNE, June 10, 2002, at 154 (the downside of profit-and-loss sharing is that it tends to
attract high-risk ventures from entrepreneurs).
154. Kuran, supra note 4, at 133.
155. Timur Kuran, The Genesis of Islamic Economics: A Chapter in the Politics of Muslim
Identity, 64 SOC. RESEARCH 301, 301-02 (1997).
156. KURAN, ISLAM & MAMMON, supra note 151, at ix.
157. Jerry Useem, supra note 153, at 154. Other financial arrangements such as derivatives
and stock options may also be prohibited. Currency hedging would not be allowed because of
gharar, a principle that prohibits one from profiting off another’s uncertainty. Nor would futures
contracts be allowed. Id. There is disagreement about whether Islam allows the issuance of bonds.
Stocks are allowed. Id.
158. Kuran, supra note 4, at 124. Through the murabaha, parties may get around the interest
ban. For example, a bank may buy a computer for a client who agrees to buy it back with a
markup as a form of interest. Virginia Postrel, Islamic Economic Principles May Sound like Just
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within an overall context of economic development in the Middle East,
some scholars from the region have argued that this and other practices
have contributed to the “commercial crisis” in the Middle East, as “the
West developed commercial institutions more efficient than those of Islam.”159
Other examples of economically detrimental cultural traits include
ethnic or caste segregation and schooling restrictions for girls. These
practices may enjoy widespread public support, even from members of
the negatively affected group,160 even though they are harmful to the
group’s own economic advancement (and violate norms of human
rights). India’s caste system is rightly viewed as a human rights issue
but also increasingly as a hurdle to the country’s socioeconomic development.161 By perpetuating the notion of deserved and inherited inequality, the system extinguishes the aspirational capacity of the lower
caste members, limits their occupational choices, closing off possibilities for upward mobility and “hinders efforts to escape from poverty….
What the Middle East Needs. In Practice, Things are More Complicated., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2004, at C2. For a discussion of economic arrangements that can be put together to comply with
the interest ban, see Islamic Banking Comes of Age—But What Next?,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=944 (login required). Islamic finance
has grown and there is now a Dow Jones Islamic Index, which includes companies that do not
produce items forbidden by Islam and have a low level of debt or earnings from interest. Id. at 3.
Despite the inefficiencies involved, clerics have generally endorsed the ban, partly because “the
elevation of religious values would enhance their own authority. Weak governments…have had
their own reasons to support Islamist efforts to define, articulate, and, where necessary, invent an
Islamic way of life” to stay in power. Timur Kuran, The Religious Undercurrents of Muslim Economic Grievances, http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kuran.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
159. Timur Kuran, The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic Underdevelopment in the Middle East 39 (USC Center for Law, Economics and Organization, Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. C01-12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=276377 (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); see also Timur Kuran, Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation, 18
J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (Summer 2004), available at http://www.atypon-link.com/AEAP/doi/
abs/10.1257/0895330042162421 (describing Islamist opposition to interest and insurance). But
see Jack A. Goldstone, Islam, Development, and the Middle East: A Comment on Timur Kuran’s
Analysis
(Mercatus
Center,
George
Mason
University,
Forum
7,
2003)
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/economic_growth_and_trade/eg/forum_series/f7_comments_on
_kuran.pdf (generally agreeing with Kuran but arguing that his thesis is incomplete). For a positive assessment of Islamic banking, especially its compatibility with microfinance, see Rahul
Dhumale and Amela Sapcanin, An Application of Islamic Banking Principles to Microfinance 1
(Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Dev. Programme, in cooperation with the Middle East & North Africa Region, World Bank, Technical Note 23073 1999), available at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/128748/An%20Application%20of%20Islamic%20
Bank%20Principles.pdf.
160. Kuran, supra note 4, at 130.
161. B.S. Sule, Illiteracy in India, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 1996, at 21.
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It thus causes economic harm through mechanisms that shape Indian beliefs, preferences, and behaviors.”162 An important work by the noted
economists George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton demonstrates how an
individual’s understanding of his or her own self, which is in turn tied to
his or her socially constructed being as a “Hindu,” an “untouchable,”
determines access to education, trading group, and social network and is
critically connected to his or her economic performance and success.163
The caste system continues “to limit economic efficiency by distorting
educational and occupational choices.”164 As studies have shown, economic growth has not weakened the rigidity of the caste system. It has
remained remarkably durable, partly because the system rests on cultural beliefs that the lower castes are simply where they are because of
past sins.
Similarly, schooling restrictions for girls, often founded on cultural
preferences favoring boys, have significant implications for economic
development. Studies have shown that “when a society denies girls an
education it loses economic competitiveness, if only by condemning all
children, including boys, to be raised by ignorant mothers in households
deficient in intellectual stimulation.”165 Along a similar line, it is increasingly clear that “[g]ender equality is not only a goal in its own
right, but an essential ingredient for achieving all other Millennium Development Goals to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, reduce child
mortality, combat AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, etc., as declared by
the United Nations in 2002.166 Gender is clearly a human rights issue as
well as a development issue. A World Bank study reported that as the
Middle East and North Africa are embarking on an export-oriented,
market-based development that would necessarily rely less on natural
resources and more on human resources, women’s participation would
be crucial to economic development there, as it was in East Asia. Yet,
women are currently “an untapped reservoir of human potential for
countries in the region.”167
162. Kuran, supra note 4, at 118.
163. Id. at 119; see also George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J.
ECON. 715 (2000); George Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST’S BOOK OF TALES 23–44 (Cambridge U. Press) (1984)
(explaining how a caste economy may be self-perpetuating).
164. Kuran, supra note 4, at 134.
165. Kuran, supra note 4, at 132.
166. WORLD BANK GENDER AND DEV. GROUP, GENDER EQUALITY & THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 21 (2003).
167. THE WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT: GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, at xiii (2004) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, MENA
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A comprehensive study on India demonstrates that “female education
is the single most important determinant of any improvement (change)
in living standards in health and education.”168 The results of this study
have been replicated in empirical studies from different countries and
confirm that education for girls produces huge rippling effects, such as
“improved birth spacing, lower infant and child mortality and morbidity,
and enhanced educational attainment of children.”169
Although the World Bank recognized that “gender and family values
are likely to be treated as the ultimate test of cultural authenticity,”170 it
also stressed that “gender is ultimately also an economic issue.”171 As
such, addressing the “gender agenda” is not only a cultural, social, or
anthropological issue,172 but also an economic development issue173
with significant implications for economic growth, productive employment and poverty reduction.174 Unfortunately, as the study noted, most
of the efforts on schooling girls have focused on overcoming external
constraints, such as lack of schools, teachers, and textbooks, and thus
“on supplying education for girls.”175 But as I have argued in this Article, more needs to be done to address internal constraints, or as the
World Bank puts it, on increasing “girls’ demand for education.”176 This
DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. Other studies show that gender inequality in education has a direct,
negative impact on economic growth by lowering the quality of human capital; interestingly, the
data also suggests that differences in growth rates between East Asia and Sub Saharan Africa,
South Asia, and the Middle East are attributable in part to gender differences among the regions.
Stephan Klasen, Does Gender Inequality Reduce Growth and Development? Evidence from
Cross-County Regressions 17–20 (The World Bank, Dev. Research Group, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 7, 1999).
168. Surji S. Bhalla, Suraj Saigal & Nabhojit Basu, Girls’ Education is It: Nothing Else Matters (Much) (World Development Report 2003/04), at 2. For example, there is a consistent and
strong correlation between higher levels of educational achievement among adult females and
lower infant mortality rates. Id. at 40. By contrast, there is no such positive correlation between
increased state expenditures and improvements in living standard—in fact, the opposite, that state
spending has “a statistically significant and negative effect on improvement in living standards.”
Id. at 57.
169. WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 167, at 28.
170. Id. at xiv; see also id. at 20 (discussing how gender-related reforms “became an important symbol of resistance to modernization and—westernization”).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1.
173. Id. at xiv; see also id. at 1–4 (discussing the costs of low participation of women in the
economy and the benefits of enhanced participation).
174. Id. at 14. See also id. at 18 (discussing how discrimination against women impedes economic efficiency); WORLD BANK GENDER AND DEV. GROUP, supra note 166, at 6 (“Investment
in human capital, especially girls’ and women’s education and health, raises productivity.”).
175. WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 167, at 38.
176. Id.
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will necessarily involve efforts at culture change, that is, to change the
widespread perception especially among rural and poor urban families
that boys have a right to education but not girls, because girls should
prepare themselves for marriage, not jobs.177 As the authors of a onehundred-country study concluded, underinvestment in girls and their
education “is not an efficient economic choice” and, to a large extent,
“can be explained by religious preference and underlying characteristics
of societies.”178 Law and development must change such preferences.
Where the objectives of economic development are incompatible
with some cultural practice, what should, from a development perspective, be done to address this conflict? Clearly, there is no uniform solution applicable to all countries. In recent years, some nationals of Latin
American, African, and Asian countries179 have themselves opted to address the culture question to alleviate what they believe to be cultural
obstacles to development, working specifically to promote a “cultural
reorientation”180 of their countries by exploring whether certain values
may be “development-prone” and “development-resistant.”181 Indeed, as
Amartya Sen noted, there is now plenty of evidence to suggest that
“[c]ultural influences can make a major difference to work ethics, responsible conduct, spirited motivation, dynamic management, entrepreneurial initiatives, willingness to take risks, and a variety of other aspects of human behavior which can be critical to economic success.”182
Although culture and its relationship to economics has been explored
177. Id. at 39.
178. David Dollar & Roberta Gatti, Gender Inequality, Income, and Growth: Are Good Times
Good for Women? 2 (The World Bank, Dev. Research Group, Working Paper Series, Paper No.
1, 1999).
179. To the extent that evaluations of culture and the movement for culture change come
from those “within” the culture, it may alleviate the concern that the push for culture change is
itself an act of cultural imperialism.
One reason is that we are chary of intervening in a culture to change its characteristics,
assuming we knew how. At a time when we think of all cultures as worthy of equal respect, what justification would we have to intervene—whether that intervention is public or private—and change a cultural feature that we think limits economic development?
Glazer, supra note 129, at 222.
180. Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 136, at 66.
181. Mariano Grondona, an Argentinean scholar, sets forth a list of twenty cultural factors
and evaluates each in accordance with whether it is favorable or resistant to economic development. Grondona, supra note 3, at 47.
182. Sen, supra note 5, at 40; see also Kuran, supra note 4, at 120 (“Some elements of any
given culture are clearly harmful to development; others are manifestly beneficial. Some promote
intercommunal mistrust and hatred; others fuel peaceful interactions. The persistence of a cultural
trait may enrich certain groups while keeping others impoverished.”).
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in different periods of Latin American history,183 the school of thought
which maintains that “economic development is a cultural process”184
has gained intellectual ground in Latin America in recent years, due
perhaps to the collapse of dependency theory.185 As the celebrated Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa observed, reforms, economic or otherwise, in Latin America cannot be successful
unless they are preceded or accompanied by a reform of our customs and ideas, of the whole complex system of habits, knowledge, images and forms that we understand by ‘culture.’ The culture within which we live and act today in Latin America is
neither liberal nor is it altogether democratic. We have democratic governments, but our institutions, our reflexes and our mentality are very far from being democratic. They remain populist
and oligarchic, or absolutist, collectivist or dogmatic, flawed by
social and racial prejudices, immensely intolerant with respect to
political adversaries, and devoted to the worst monopoly of all,
that of the truth.186
That is to say, “[t]he paradox of economic development is that economic values are not enough to ensure it. Economic development is too
important to be entrusted solely to economic values. The values accepted or neglected by a nation fall within the cultural field.”187 One
could ask, for example, if certain values and attitudes may be an obstacle to economic progress and whether elite groups—the politicians, the
military, business-people, clergy, intellectuals, and leftists— in Latin
America subscribe to such values and attitudes.188
In a provocative article, a Cameroonian scholar questions the African
mindset189 that subscribes to values not conducive to economic pro183. For a discussion of the various efforts in Latin America towards effectuating changes in
values and attitudes, see Lawrence E. Harrison, Promoting Progressive Cultural Change, in
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 297–99 (discussing works by eminent writers from Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Spain, Peru, among others, that question whether traditional
Ibero-American values have a retarding effect on economic change in the region).
184. Grondona, supra note 3, at 46.
185, Dependency theory generally holds that given the structural power system endemic to
the international economic framework, developing countries are consigned to a perpetual position
of dependency on the industrialized, economically advanced country. See Lan Cao, Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning?, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 545, 551–54 (1997).
186. Harrison, supra note 183, at 297–98 (citation omitted).
187. Grondona, supra note 3, at 46.
188. Carlos Alberto Montaner, Culture and the Behavior of Elites in Latin America, in
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 56.
189. Despite the immense “diversity—the vast number of subcultures” in Africa, the author
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gress, for example, exalting the past rather than the future,190 associating
authority and dominance with birth status rather than merit,191 subordinating the individual to the community,192 excessively celebrating conviviality and rejecting open conflict,193 and “attribut[ing] very little importance…to the financial and economic aspects of life.”194 Although
African culture, according to him, is “one of the most—if not the
most—humanistic cultures in existence,”195 “peaceful cultural revolutions”196 must be undertaken “to change Africa’s destiny”197 by “asserting the absolute preeminence of education, by suppressing the construction of religious structures and other palaces to the detriment of schools,
and by modifying the content of the curricula, accenting not only science but especially the necessary changes of the African society.”198 The
educational system in Africa must promote critical thinking, dissent, the
importance of creating “businesspeople, and therefore job creators,”199
and changes in the role of women in African society.200 To transform the
economic culture, “[w]e must accept profit as the engine of development.”201
Not just in African countries but in many traditional village societies,
“other-regarding and redistributive norms” as well as strong authority

believes that it is possible to generalize about African culture because “there is a foundation of
shared values, attitudes, and institutions that binds together the nations south of the Sahara, and in
many respects those to the north as well.” Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 136, at 67.
190. This means an absence of “dynamic perception of the future.” Id. at 69.
191. This means that “[i]n Africa, you must be born dominant; otherwise you have no right to
power except by coup d’etat.” Id. at 70.
192. One of the byproducts of this norm is that “[t]he concept of individual responsibility
does not exist in our hyper-centralized traditional structures. In Cameroon, the word ‘responsible’
translates as ‘chief.’” Id. at 71. Another byproduct is that without the notion of individual responsibility, “those that occupy an intermediate position in the hierarchy” are held in contempt, as it is
understood that the one to solve a problem is only the minister himself. Id.
193. This means “[f]riendship comes before business” and differences, even legitimate ones,
are suppressed in order to maintain social harmony. “In some African societies, the avoidance of
conflict means that justice cannot be rendered in the daytime.” Id. at 72.
194. Id. This means that “[o]ther than some social groups like the well-known Bamileke of
Cameroon or the Kamba of Kenya, the African is a bad H. economicus.” Id.
195. Id. at 75. African humanistic values include “the solidarity beyond age classification and
social status; social interaction; the love of neighbor, whatever the color of his skin; the defense
of the environment, and so many others.” Id.
196. Id. at 76.
197. Id. at 75.
198. Id. at 76.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 77.
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patterns are among the most cherished and widely accepted norms.202
Close-knit village communities characterized by strong kinship and
other personalistic ties tend to be “‘group-focused’ societies,” which
nurture a presumption against individualistic pursuits that may elevate
an individual above his or her group or threaten the traditional pattern of
authority.203 Norms against individual accumulation of wealth are either
internalized or enforced by severe sanctions that run the gamut from
public humiliation and ostracism to even more outlandish accusations,
for example, that individuals who violate such norms will either be punished by a supernatural power or are themselves exploiting others
through witchcraft or other treacherous means.204 To make amends, such
enriched individuals are expected to comply with the community’s redistributive norms by sharing their surplus with others.205 Norms of
solidarity are useful as they ensure the survival of all. In such societies,
“[p]rivate wealth accumulation is perceived as an antisocial behavior
because it is an attempt to break away from traditional solidarity networks.”206 Yet such norms of “‘[f]orced mutual help’”207 can also prevent the accumulation of wealth, capital investment, and growth and
suppress individual initiatives.
Even more insidiously, such norms also tend to favor a status quo
maintenance, further entrenching traditional elites—chiefs, elders,
priests, typically “old men belonging to the dominant lineages”208—who
“do not accept that commoners rise above them by acquiring old or new
symbols of wealth and status.”209 Witchcraft accusations, hurled against
dynamic upstarts who dare challenge the traditional hierarchical structure, are of course prohibited if uttered against traditional elites.210
Development agencies that introduced projects which might disturb
the status of traditional elites have encountered strong resistance.211 For
example, in Guinea Bissau, when an NGO instituted a program to train
202. Anita Abraham & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Participatory Development: Where Culture
Creeps In, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, supra note 4, at 211.
203. Id. at 212–13.
204. Id. at 213, 216.
205. Id. at 215.
206. Id. at 215; see also id. at 215–16 (“[R]edistributive norms that enjoin economically successful individuals to share their surplus appear as a form of taxation designed to curb positional
race for status.”).
207. Id. at 215.
208. Id. at 217.
209. Id. at 216.
210. Id.
211. Examples in this paragraph are drawn from Id. at 220–223.
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professional fishermen and distributed fishing equipment to groups of
village youths, the local king objected to young members receiving assets when he did not. In a northeastern region of Burkina Faso, an NGO
helped a women’s group acquire a mill, which was confiscated by the
local chief who viewed it as a status symbol that should be bestowed
upon him instead. In the same general area, a local chief who engaged
in various mischiefs was nonetheless chosen, because he was chief, to
be the chairman of a village-wide association created by an NGO to improve irrigation. When the chief awarded preferential dealings to his
brother and pursued other dubious activities, the members did not remove him as chairman out of deference to his identity and status.
Such commitment to authoritarian pattern, status and personal relationships are likely to conflict with the values of equality, whether it be
in terms of participation or economic opportunities. Since the currency
crisis in Asia in 1997, for example, there is a similar effort to change
“the traditionally particularistic personal relationships that have dominated the East Asian economies”212 because of the possibility that such
relationships can impede individual initiatives213 or even foster corruption.214 Other cultural traits, the tradition of taking a “long view,” for
example, has meant that many East Asian businesses neglected periodically to monitor the profitability of enterprises. “The supposed virtue of
such long-term perspectives was reinforced by the cultural propensity to
212. Harrison, supra note 121, at xxiii.
213. Though personalistic and kinship ties can facilitate economic growth, at some point they
can also be a drag on economic development, dampening individual incentives to invest and accumulate wealth. Max Weber, of course, argued that the spread of Calvinism, which emphasized
“individualistic motives of rational legal acquisition by virtue of one’s own ability and initiative,”
MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 179 (1930), quoted in
ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM 47 (1979), “had the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics.”
WEBER, supra, at 171, quoted in MCFARLANE, supra, at 47. By elevating rational thought over
superstition and magic and the pursuit of individual over communal interests, Protestantism
helped to “shatter the fetters of the kinship group.” WEBER, supra, at 139, quoted in
MCFARLANE, supra, at 50. Subsequent scholars have echoed Weber’s warnings of the fetters of
kinship. See, e.g., PETER T. BAUER & BASIL S. YARNEY, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 64 (1957) (“[T]he extended family…is an example of an institution
which has many advantages in one stage of economic achievement, but which may later become a
drag on economic development.”); ARTHUR LEWIS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 114
(1955) (“The extended family system has tremendous advantages in societies living at a subsistence level, but it seems not to be appropriate to societies where economic growth is occurring. In
such societies it is almost certainly a drag on effort.”).
214. ARTHUR LEWIS, supra note 213, at 114 (noting that strong group ties may facilitate bureaucratic corruption and nepotism because bureaucrats may be bound first by obligations to traditional networks rather than to outsiders with superior credentials).
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see great virtue in delayed gratification and the willingness to suffer in
the short run in the expectation that in time there would be greater rewards for steadfastness.”215 Such values and behaviors were useful at
the initial stages of development but produced problems at the later
stages.
There are efforts underway to confront cultural issues and their relationship to economic development. In the section below, I examine how
a positive relationship between the two can be produced, focusing specifically on the catalyst question, that is, on the ways in which change
may be effectuated, through internal or external pressure, or by bottomup or top-down implementation.

IV. TO CHANGE A CULTURE
A.

Opposition to the Project

There are preliminary issues to consider in the course of deliberating
culture change. First, one is sure to encounter resistance, based on a
claim of cultural integrity, from culture defenders or multiculturalists
who oppose what they consider to be an assault on cultural identity.
Second, opponents of culture change are likely to be even more opposed
to the project if change is externally imposed or influenced based on the
notion of cultural self-determination. In the section below, I examine
those two objections and explore the implications they have for my proposal.
With respect to the claim that cultures should be defended from
change, the response is simple: Cultures have always changed—
Orientalist stereotypes about the unchanging nature of the non-West
notwithstanding.216As Amartya Sen observed, culture is not “independent, unchanging and unchangeable.”217 History shows that encounters
initially viewed as threats may transform one’s very perceptions and
preferences. Something deemed foreign in origin may in fact become
domesticated and indigenous over time; Turks, for example, no longer
view as “un-Turklike” French transplants such as specialized secular
courts to hear commercial disputes.218 Along more mundane lines, al215. Lucian W. Pye, “Asian Values”From Dynamos to Dominoes?, in CULTURE MATTERS,
supra note 3, at 253.
216. See supra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.
217. Sen, supra note 5, at 44.
218. Kuran, supra note 4, at 131-32.
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though chili is not an indigenous Indian spice but was brought to India
by the Portuguese in the 16th century, it is now considered very much
Indian.219
It is often presumed that a particular culture, “Indonesian,” for example, is “simply Indonesian.” Yet, history suggests more complexity. Indonesian history reveals not just Islamic tradition but strong Hindu,
Buddhist, and Confucian cultural presence and influence.220 Contrary to
claims by Hindu nationalists, India has a long history of cultural diversity—a thousand years of Buddhist dominance, with Christians present
since the fourth century and Parsees and Muslims since the eighth century. Thus, even when one invokes culture as an identity issue, the term
often embodies great historical variations and heterogeneity even within
an individual culture itself.221
Culture is all the more “nonhomogeneous, nonstatic, and interactive”222 in today’s globalized world. Anthropologists have noted this
shift223 and the resulting similarities across societies as well as the resulting heterogeneity within societies:224 The modern world is no longer
“tightly territorialized, spatially bounded…[and] culturally homogeneous.”225 Thus, “the boundaries of cultural systems are leaky, and that
traffic and osmosis are the norm, not the exception.”226 Cultures move
and interact, and from this process, undergo change. Modern cultures
are characterized by cracks, fissures, change and transformation. As
Salman Rushdie described the mongrelized selves spawned from this
modern condition:
219. Sen, supra note 5, at 44.
220. Id. at 42.
221. Id. at 43 (“Cultural determinists often underestimate the extent of heterogeneity within
what is taken to be ‘one’ distinct culture.”).
222. Id. at 44.
223. See, e.g., JAMES CLIFFORD, ROUTES: TRAVEL AND TRANSLATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 246 (1997) (remarking that “[s]eparate places become effectively a single
community ‘through the continuous circulation of people, money, goods, and information’”).
224. ARIF DIRLIK, THE POSTCOLONIAL AURA: THIRD WORLD CRITICISM IN THE AGE OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 72 (1997) (discussing “global motions of peoples (and, therefore, cultures),
the weakening of boundaries…[and] simultaneous homogenization and fragmentation within and
across societies…”); Arjun Appadurai & Carol A. Breckenridge, Why Public Culture?, 1 PUB.
CULTURE 5, 7 (1988) (“The world which cultural anthropologists have so far taken for granted is
in the process of vanishing. More and more societies are characterized by profound internal cultural debates….” (citation omitted)).
225. ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBALIZATION 48 (1996).
226. Arjun Appadurai, The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition, in
CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, supra note 4, at 61; see also id. (describing the critical elements
of culture in globalization as “mixture, heterogeneity, diversity…and plurality.”).
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I was born an Indian, and not only an Indian, but a Bombayite—
Bombay, that most cosmopolitan, most hybrid, most hotchpotch
of Indian cities. My writing and thought have therefore been as
deeply influenced by Hindu myths and attitudes as Muslim
ones…. Nor is the West absent from Bombay. I was already a
mongrel self, history's bastard, before London aggravated the
condition.227
If cultures have always changed and continue to change, what does it
mean, then, to defend “authentic” cultures? At its best, it may simply
mean understanding the lessons of colonialism. And it may simply reflect a legitimate concern about repeating the nineteenth century quest
to civilize the Third World, not justified as it was then, on the basis of
superior Western morality, but rather, in more sophisticated and acceptable language of today—as an imperative of modernity. While global
trade has also meant global diffusion of cultures, one might be concerned that countries with greater power could also overwhelm those
with lesser power, not just economically but also culturally, with the latter finding itself in a position of “submissive supplication.”228
On the other hand, defenders of local cultures may also be quite misguided, and attempts to keep out foreign cultures motivated by much
less justifiable concerns. A confrontational or hostile stance against the
influence of foreign cultures—described by proponents as bravely
standing up to Western domination—may in fact be “deeply foreigndependent in a negative and contrary form.”229 In other words, this
movement defines itself as the “Other,” that which the West is not, in a
vein not that dissimilar, ironically, from that of the Orientalist tradition.
Local culture, thus, is understood to be oppositional to or different from
whatever Western culture is deemed to be. Quite simply, “[s]eeing oneself as ‘the other’ does less than justice to one’s free and deliberative
agency.”230 Moreover, often under the banner of protecting local culture,
these defenders “rule out certain choices, on traditionalist grounds, because of their ‘foreignness’ (irrespective of what people decide to
choose, in an informed and reflected way).”231 Citizens, therefore, are
denied the exercise of cultural options by “political authorities, or by re227. SALMAN RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS 393, 394, 404 (1991).
228. Rao & Walton, supra note 91, at 20; see also EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND
IMPERIALISM, at xi (1993) (describing the European view of their colonial enterprise as “bringing
civilization to primitive or barbaric peoples…[who] deserved to be ruled”).
229. Sen, supra note 5, at 54.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 53.
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ligious establishments, or by grand guardians of taste.”232
With the force and leverage of public international law behind them,
defenders of culture cast their project in cultural self-determination language233 and disparage internal challenges to cultural traditions as foreign and inauthentic.234 Public international law thus puts its force and
weight into preserving cultures and insulating them from change, assuming in essence that international law must favor cultural integrity
over cultural change, committing the discipline to “the old-world view
of cultural diversity as existing across cultures, but not within them.”235
This is because the right to cultural self-determination has been “interpreted to defend cultural groups against the forces of modernization and
change. Internal cultural ferment is suppressed as law authorizes the exclusion of dissenters who threaten to dilute a culture's distinctiveness.”236
Yet a view that privileges that particular understanding of cultural
self-determination ignores change and diversity within every culture.
Anthropologists have noted, for example, that “dissensus…is part and
parcel of culture and…a shared culture is no more a guarantee of complete consensus than a shared platform in the democratic convention.”237
Culture is not only about affiliation or loyalty, but also about dissensus
or dissent, challenge by members who seek to contest and reinterpret
traditional cultural norms.238 Far from being intrinsically stable or in232. Id.; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE
AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 250 (1999) (“It often turns out that oppressive practices defended by a
state or group as essential to its survival are no more than the self-interested preferences of its
current power-elite.”).
233. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights endows minority cultures with
rights such as the “right…to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or
to use their own language.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 3, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 (declaring that all state parties must ensure the social and cultural rights of their people); Universal Declaration of Human Rights art.
27(1), G.A. Res. 217A, at 76, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948) (asserting that all persons have a right to participate in the cultural life of the community).
234. Richard T. Ford, The Repressed Community: Locating the New Communitarianism, 65
TRANSITION 96, 99 (1995) (describing how the claim that there is “a singular, ‘authentic’ or essential identity…involves more than ignoring the claims of dissenters and marginalized subgroups, it requires representing those claims as dishonest or illegitimate”).
235. Sunder, supra note 7, at 500. This stance also allows public international law to sidestep
cultural issues because culture has to be preserved and insulated from the critical eye of law under
the name of cultural integrity, authenticity and self-determination. See supra text and accompanying notes 220-34.
236. Sunder, supra note 7, at 500.
237. Appadurai, supra note 226, at 61.
238. Sunder, supra note 7, at 498; see also Seyla Benhabib, Cultural Complexity, Moral In-
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ert239 or bounded by geographical demarcations, cultures, especially in
the modern globalized world, are alive and changing, challenged and
shaped by an ongoing process of internal as well as external pressures.240
This radically different understanding of culture as dynamic and heterogeneous, whether in response to internal or external change, leads to
a different understanding of law and development and its relationship to
culture. In a globalized world characterized by transnational cultural exchanges and internal cultural challenges, the argument that culture must
be protected from change is not convincing. As transnational influence
becomes all the more inevitable, it is also not convincing to claim that
external influence is per se normatively illegitimate. Indeed, to argue
otherwise is to concede that certain values, such as egalitarianism, are
external to certain societies,241 or that certain societies are uniformly
characterized by certain values only and not other values.242 This assumption that the world is divided into “impenetrable civilizational
camps” viewed in oppositional terms, such as an Islamic versus a Western camp, obscures the fact that certain values are shared by both.243 Islam, for example, has had a history of celebrating religious freedom,
tolerance and pluralism; Akbar, a Muslim emperor of India, ordered that
“no one ‘should be interfered with on account of religion’ and that ‘anyone is to be allowed to go over to a religion that pleases him.’”244 During the same time period in the 1590s, Europe was in the midst of the
Inquisitions. Given this history, it is inaccurate to characterize pluralism
as solely a Western value245 and to reject attempts to influence the deterdependence, and the Global Dialogical Community, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND
DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 235, 240 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan
Glover eds., 1995) (“Very often, cultures are presented as hermetic and sealed wholes; the internal contradictions and debates within cultures are flattened out; the different conceptual and normative options which are available to the participants of a given culture and society are ignored.”). Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Brave, Young and Muslim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at
A31 (describing efforts by Arab-Muslim youth to bring about democracy in the Middle East, to
reform Islam, and to rediscover its pluralistic tradition).
239. To the extent that culture defenders wish to preserve cultures from change, their position
is eerily similar to that of the Orientalists who see non-Western cultures in unchanging, static
terms. See supra notes 110–18 and accompanying text.
240. ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBALIZATION 27–65 (1996).
241. Madhavi Sunder, Enlightened Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 891, 892–93 (2005).
242. See Amartya Sen, A World Not Neatly Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at A39.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC
DEMOCRACY 6 (2003) (demonstrating that liberty, equality, and democracy are compatible with
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velopment of pluralism in Muslim societies as illegitimate external imposition.246
Not only is pluralism part of Islam’s history, it is currently part of the
“internal struggle within Islam to re-examine its texts and articulate a
path for how one can accept pluralism and modernity.”247 Shirin Ebadi,
for example, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003 for her efforts to
achieve freedom and equality for women within Islamic Iran.248 The
Arab Human Development Reports issued in 2002, 2003, and 2004 proclaimed pluralism to be vital to human development.249 Cultures are increasingly characterized by internal challenges and debates about cultural meanings, identities and values,250 and contrary to the claims of
those who defend cultures on the grounds of cultural preservation, there
is no “singular, ‘authentic’ or essential identity”251 that needs to be preserved or protected from external influence.
Besides the fact that seemingly oppositional values are indeed reconcilable internally within one culture, so that Islam, for example, can incorporate egalitarian and pluralistic commitments, one could also simply view certain basic values as universal. The Constitution of India
incorporated rights and reflected values that were drawn from many
constitutions in the world,252 provoking critics to charge that as such, it
“‘will break down soon after being brought into operation.’”253 Yet,
many of India’s Constitution drafters insisted that “India should be
rightfully able to benefit from the world’s intellectual heritage.”254
“What the Indian Constitutionalists recognized is that the Enlightenment
ideals of democracy, equality, reason, and dissent are not and cannot be
the intellectual properties of Western nations alone, but are rightfully the
Islam).
246. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 888 (2005) (arguing
that external Western influence is external imposition which will lead to a distortion of the very
values the West wishes to develop, such as equality and liberty, in nascent Islamic democracies).
247. Thomas L. Friedman, The Real War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A19.
248. Scott MacLeod, One Woman’s Way, TIME INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 15, 2003, at 44, available at www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2003/press.html.
249. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2003: BUILDING A KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 121.
250. See supra notes 217–47 and accompanying text; see also Friedman, supra note 238, at
A31. Neil MacFarquhar, Unexpected Whiff of Freedom Proves Bracing for the Mideast, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1.
251. Ford, supra note 234, at 99.
252. Sunder, supra note 241, at 899.
253. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 325
(1966) (citation omitted).
254. Sunder, supra note 241, at 899.
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treasures of the world.”255 In this sense, culture is understood and
judged not by its source or geography but “by its manifest use and enjoyment.”256 As Rabindranath Tagore, who received the Nobel Prize in
literature in 1913, put it:
Whatever we understand and enjoy in human products instantly
becomes ours, wherever they might have their origin. I am proud
of my humanity when I can acknowledge the poets and artists of
other countries as my own. Let me feel with unalloyed gladness
that all the great glories of man are mine.257
But if certain desirable values have not been part of a particular society’s cultural fabric, what then? From a universalist perspective,258 the
issue is not whether a value is internal or external to a society, or promoted by insiders or outsiders. Salman Rushdie put it this way:
[I]f by chance there were a universal value that might, for the
sake of argument, be called freedom, whose enemies—tyranny,
bigotry, intolerance, fanaticism—were the enemies of us all; and
if this “freedom” were discovered to exist in greater quantity in
the countries of the West than anywhere else on earth; and if, in
the world as it actually exists, rather than in some unattainable
Utopia, the authority of the United States were the best current
guarantor of that “freedom”; then might it not follow that to oppose the spread of American culture would be to take up arms
against the wrong foe?259
A cross cultural or transnational perspective can make a culture receptive to critical thinking, deliberation and dissent. “The exclusion of
slaves in one society, untouchables in another, and women in still another may be much harder to sustain when other societies show the way
255. Id.
256. Sen, supra note 5, at 54.
257. Id. at 55; see also Amartya Sen, Speech at the Nobel Banquet, (Dec. 10, 1998),
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1998/sen-speech.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). (referring to Tagore, Sen noted that, “[h]is universalist, tolerant and rationalist ideals were a strong
influence on my thinking, and I often recollect them in these divisive times”). Sen has also noted
elsewhere that Tagore firmly believed “in the ‘non-fragility’ of Indian culture and civilisation; he
believed that it was broad and of many parts, each related to and influenced by the other. Tagore,
said Sen, did not believe that there was a conflict between the cultures and civilisations of the
East and the West, and was against ‘closing the shutters’ to outside influences.” Parvathi Menon,
A Special Homecoming, FRONTLINE, Jan. 2–15, 1999, available at http://www.frontlineonnet
.com/fl1601/16011300.htm.
258. See supra notes 252–57 and accompanying text.
259. SALMAN RUSHDIE, STEP ACROSS THIS LINE 268–69 (2002).
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to different types of social arrangements.”260 Cultures that sanction such
practices will be defended, predictably, by self-interested elites who
elevate self-determination over other values, for example, equality, reason, freedom.261 But in recent years, liberals and feminists have critiqued attempts to elevate cultural rights on many grounds, for example,
that they preserve the status quo at the expense of women and children;262 that they tend to “enforce cultural orthodoxy over progressive
cultural dissent”;263 and that they are preserved often by suppressing individual autonomy.264
In the section below, I push this critique further and ask if cultural attributes that constrain economic development should be changed,
whether by insiders or outsiders, from the top down or the bottom up.
On this issue I look to Tagore, who while rejecting Western domination
also rejected the brand of nationalism that would erect walls and close
off borders. As Tagore said, “we neither have the right nor the power to
exclude this people [the British] from the building of the destiny of India.”265

B.

How To Change a Culture

This section is but the beginning of future works that will provide a
more detailed, prescriptive agenda addressing the complex normative
issues involved in culture change. Some of the questions to be explored
include how culturally-based choices can be altered by governments,
individuals, NGOs and development agencies; how the social meaning
of an undesirable practice, refusing education for girls, for example, can
be changed; the methods of change that may be useful, whether it be
education, information, persuasion, coercion, or the provision of economic incentives; and the institutional arrangements, such as public260. Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Tradition, in RELATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 299–320 (Michael Krausz ed.,
1989).
261. See Sunder, supra note 241, at 894 (“[F]ar from one uber value—democratic selfdetermination—the globe pulsates with commitments to a number of incommensurable, universal
values.”); see also Sen, supra note 5, at 53.
262. Janet E. Halley, Culture Constraints, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 100,
103–04 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999); Susan Moller Okin, Reply, in IS MULTICULTURALISM
BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra, at 115.
263. Yael Tamir, Siding with the Underdogs, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?,
supra note 262, at 47.
264. Halley, supra note 262, at 100 (noting how cultural preservation claims focus on the liberation of a culture from external coercion and ignore claims that it constrains and suppresses).
265. RABINDRANATH TAGORE, NATIONALISM 131 (Greenwood Press 1973) (1917).
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private partnerships, that would best accomplish the desired objectives.
Japan is the most obvious example of a country that has successfully
launched culture change campaigns. When it realized it was militarily
and economically inferior to Europe, it committed itself to change, not
just by adopting new legal codes, but also by implementing a systematic
culture change project.266 During the period known as the Meiji Restoration of 1860, the Japanese saw that they were not equal to “the more
progressive powers of the world”267 and decided to modernize by bringing foreign experts to Japan and sending Japanese agents abroad to
study European ways. The Meiji Restoration was a “revolution from
above” to learn “the ways of the West in order to reform virtually every
aspect of national life,”268 and through this reformation, defend the
country from Western threat.269 The Japanese government modeled its
military and its legal codes after those of Germany. It adopted measures
to create a sense of nationhood which had been virtually nonexistent
during the quarter millennium of Tokugawa rule, for example, establishing a national postal service, public education for boys and girls, universal military service, etc., to “imbue its subjects with a sense of higher
duty to the emperor and country and to link this patriotism to work.”270
Throughout its history, Japan took extraordinary efforts to involve the
Japanese people in various national cultural projects.271 The process included interaction and cooperation between Japanese private groups and
an interventionist Japanese state to formulate and implement programs
to manage society.272 From the 1600s to the mid 1800s, authorities of
the shogunate, through “kyoka,” or “moral suasion,” “exhorted peasants
to work hard, pay their taxes, and avoid luxury.”273 Thus, bureaucracies
from various ministries were established to run moral suasion campaigns, many of which aimed to instill changes in customary habits, and
through such changes to encourage the formation of capital and produc266. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion of Japan’s Meiji Restoration is drawn from Landes, Culture Makes Almost All the Difference, supra note 131, at 7–10; see also Cao, The Ethnic
Question in Law and Development, supra note 131, at 1071-75.
267. Sidney D. Brown, Okubo Toshimichi: His Political and Economic Policies in Early
Meiji Japan, 21 J. ASIAN STUD. 183–190 (1961/1962).
268. Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 588 (2001).
269. Bill Ong Hing, Nonelectoral Activism in Asian Pacific American Communities and the
Implications for Community Lawyering, 8 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 246, 248 n.16 (2002).
270. Landes, Culture Makes Almost All the Difference, supra note 131, at 10.
271. SHELDON GARON, MOLDING JAPANESE MINDS 6 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 7.
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tive investment.274 The Ministry of Education introduced “daily life improvement campaigns” to teach “scientific budgeting, better nutrition
and hygiene, and avoiding wasteful spending on festivals, alcohol, and
tobacco.”275 The Home Ministry and the Ministry of Education, which
were responsible for campaigns to reform norms and habits of the
poor,276routinely received reports from district chiefs containing detailed
“village-by-village information on the time spent on funerals and weddings and, in the case of weddings, the numbers attending, the type of
cermemony [sic], and what was served.”277
To ensure success, the government sought the involvement of community leaders of women and youth groups, religious organizations and
other civic associations. It used all available methods—motion pictures,
handbills distributed to households, posters exhorting savings and frugality278—to supplement moral suasion, promote “middle-class commitments to the modernization of popular beliefs, daily habits, and gender relations,”279 and “eliminate the ‘evil customs of the past.’”280 In
some instances, the government joined forces with “Western-educated
Protestant social reformers…to teach the poor the virtues of hard work,
savings, and self-help”—all with the aim “to improve the diet, hygiene,
work habits, housing, consumption patterns, and ritual life of the Japanese people.”281 Indeed, as some have put it, “[t]he cultural values underlying Japan’s successful strategy in catching up with the West were
nurtured and manipulated by the elites in the interest of the developmental state.”282
To be sure, efforts at culture change are less likely to be controversial
274. In development economics, the elimination of wasteful spending is a necessary step towards capital formation, accumulation, and investment. W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development
with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CLASSIC
PERSPECTIVES, CRITIQUES, AND REFLECTIONS 59, 75 (Rajani Kanth ed., 1994). Given the traditional tendency in many societies to spend surplus capital on “tombs, country houses, temples,”
and other economically unproductive activities, a key issue in development is to “tempt capital
into productive channels rather than into the building of monuments,” or spending on funerals,
weddings and other lavish ceremonies. Id. at 73.
275. GARON, supra note 271, at 11.
276. Id. at 15–16.
277. Id. at 12–13.
278. Id. at 13.
279. Id. at 19.
280. Id. at 20.
281. Id.
282. Charlotte G. O’Kelly, The Future of Hong Kong: Prospects, 547 ANNALS 176, 177
(Sept. 1996) (reviewing CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN, WHO GOVERNS? THE RISE OF THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1995) and WILLIAM K. TABB, THE POSTWAR JAPANESE SYSTEM:
CULTURAL ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION (1995)).
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within law and development circles if the underlying cultural norm is at
odds with modern notions of human rights. Turkey, for example, had required midwife and nursing students to be virgins and testing could be
performed to ensure compliance. In 2002, in an effort to be admitted to
the European Union, Turkey issued a directive banning forced virginity
testing.283 As a ratifier of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Turkey is obligated to abolish not only discriminatory laws but also “to promote
equality by breaking down commonly held stereotypes impacting culture and tradition.”284 Although human rights groups applaud this decree, commentators rightly warn that because Turkey “faces a tension
between enduring cultural norms and international human rights standards,” legislation is likely to be inadequate unless the government follows up with a nationwide educational campaign.285 Such is the situation in South Africa as well. South Africa’s 2005 ban on virginity testing
is vociferously opposed by tribal leaders “who saw the legislation as an
attack on ancient tribal culture and family values.”286 A women’s rights
leader observed: “For the majority of women who live in rural areas,
customary law basically consigns them to be minors all their lives, under their fathers, their husbands, their brothers….”287
Other CEDAW member countries, such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and
Indonesia, acknowledged that implementing CEDAW has been difficult
because of “entrenched traditional attitudes regarding women.”288 Given
“the persistence of cultural norms that give preference to men,”289 experts in this area have suggested “‘massive awareness campaigns’ at
both the national and local levels.”290 Similarly, although there are efforts to alter inheritance patterns that exclude women and that are
“deeply embedded in notions of cultures and tradition,” these efforts
have occurred primarily at the statutory level.291 Yet unless cultural
283. Chante Lasco, Virginity Testing in Turkey: A Violation of Women’s Human Rights, 9
HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2002, at 10, 10.
284. Hadar Harris, Current Processes for Assessment of Women’s Human Rights in International Law, ASIL INSIGHT, March 2005, www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insights050316.html; see
also Lasco, supra note 283, at 13.
285. Lasco, supra note 283, at 10.
286. Sharon LaFraniere, Women’s Rights Laws and African Custom Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30, 2005, at A1.
287. Id.
288. Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1998, 33 INT’L LAW. 637, 639–41 (Summer 1999).
289. Id. at 641.
290. Id. at 640.
291. Abby Morrow Richardson, Women’s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to Integrate
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norms are confronted and altered, through deliberate education campaigns292 and other measures,293 “[t]hese statutory changes generally
have no practical effect on the great majority of the population.”294
Indeed, after Egypt’s health minister banned the genital mutilation of
girls,295 villagers across the country planned to continue the custom and
even officials in charge of implementing the law acknowledged “that
some social customs are too potent to be extinguished by law.”296 It was
not until one of Egypt’s largest nonprofit development groups targeted
the practice that female genital mutilation became virtually nonexistent
in Tayeba, a village outside Cairo of mostly Coptic Christians. The
group pursued an education campaign aimed at women, religious leaders, and unmarried men, portraying the issue as a literacy, family planning, and health care issue.297 In other words, if a cultural norm such as
female genital mutilation carries a certain socially constructed meaning
that is traditionally deemed desirable,298 the underlying meaning must
be changed before the cultural norm can be successfully altered. The
development group succeeded because it was able to change the meaning of female genital mutilation, moving it from a cultural or religious
to a human health domain.299
The group enters a village only with an invitation signed by community leaders, appoints a two-person team to live in the village for as long
as seven years, trains local volunteers to continue the group’s objectives
Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 19, 22.
292. Id. at 22.
293. Japan, for example, prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex in recruitment, hiring, assignment, and promotion decisions. Kelly Barrett, Women in the Workplace:
Sexual Discrimination in Japan, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 5, 6. But the law also allows the Ministry of Labor to “‘make a public announcement’” if an employer fails to comply
with the Ministry’s directive. Id. “Because of deep-seated cultural norms, the theory behind this
sanction is that the threat of public embarrassment will be enough to prevent companies from discriminating on the basis of gender.” Id.
294. Richardson, supra note 291, at 19.
295. In Egypt, the procedure is performed by midwives or barbers, often without anesthesia
and under non-hygienic conditions. Neil MacFarquhar, Egypt Facing Defiance of Ban on Genital
Mutilation of Girls, GLOBE AND MAIL NEWS, Aug. 19, 1996, at N14.
296. Id.
297. John Lancaster, Village Gives Up a Painful Ritual, WASH. POST, June 21, 1998, at A19.
298. For example, in countries that practice female genital mutilation, the practice is justified
on the grounds that girls not subject to female genital mutilation will become nymphomaniacs,
and therefore those who have been subject to the procedure are “good” girls. Philip Smucker,
Egyptian Women Fight Circumcision, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 25, 2001, at A4.
299. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. at 903, 905,
950–52 (1996) (describing efforts in the U.S. to change the meaning of smoking, from one associated with cool rebellion to one associated with lung cancer).
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after the team leaves, and conducts follow-up work. Volunteers visited
local houses to give women information on family planning and health
care before slowly introducing the topic of female circumcision. Despite
initial hostile reactions, the group has achieved a 70 percent success
rate, with success being determined by asking whether girls remain uncircumcised past the age of twelve.300 The Egyptian education campaign, headed by the Ministry of Health, has been funded by U.S. and
U.N. money and has garnered a 75 percent eradication rate even in
Egypt’s more remote villages.301 Similar successes have been reported
elsewhere, for example, Senegal. There, a nonprofit organization, along
with local women enrolled in a course on health care, launched a campaign of “information and persuasion” to convince more than 400 villages to end genital cutting.302
China, too, has tried culture change. In an effort to address the growing problem of “missing” girls in China, resulting from abortion of female fetuses due to the traditional Chinese preference for boy children,
the Chinese government has instituted a massive campaign, including
subsidies, to reverse the trend.303 Under this program, families of girl
students receive free tuition for their children. Additionally, because
preference for boy children, especially in rural areas, reflected the family’s desire for male farm laborers and old-age care traditionally provided by sons, the government introduced a pilot program under which
300,000 rural elders are entitled to receive a general annual pension of
$180 if they had only one child or daughters.304 To change traditional
attitudes, the government urged schools to hold parades in a “Care for
Girls” program, and billboards announce a “Respect Girls” campaign.305
Current efforts undertaken in many developing countries to effectuate
culture change have appropriately targeted educational reform. For example, after determining that Japanese children learned progressive values and Peruvian children did not, a Peruvian businessman established
the Institute of Human Development in 1990 in Peru to promote the
“Ten Commandments of Development: order, cleanliness, punctuality,
responsibility, achievement, honesty, respect for the rights of others, re300. Lancaster, supra note 297.
301. Smucker, supra note 298 (describing 75 percent eradication of the practice in remote
Egyptian villages as a result of a community-based propaganda campaign).
302. Thomas Gagen, Social Change in Senegal, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2001, at A26.
303. Jim Yardley, Fearing Future, China Starts to Give Girls Their Due, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2005, at A3.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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spect for the law, work ethic, and frugality.”306 The Institute’s works
have been adopted by Nicaragua’s Minister of Education in his own
educational reform projects and by Mexico’s prestigious Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Studies.307
Lest one too blithely disparage efforts to institute change through the
educational system, it is important to note that scholars have long studied how “education constructs culture.”308 The works of Pierre Bourdieu
demonstrate that “‘the central role that schools have in both changing
and in reproducing social and cultural [structures]…from one generation
to the next.’”309 As Bourdieu explains,
If it be accepted that culture…is a common code enabling all
those possessing that code to attach the same meaning to the
same words, the same types of behavior and the same works,
then it is clear that the school…is the fundamental factor in the
cultural consensus in as far as it represents the sharing of a common sense which is the prerequisite for communications.310
Education would play a vital role in the construction and reshaping of
such cultural traditions—whether to promote frugality, trust, delaying
gratification, sacrificing for the national interest, the time value of
money—by adopting “a process of formalization and ritualization”311
and “‘organizing cultural productions,’”312 as undertaken by Japan during the Meiji restoration period.
Although the degree of the state’s involvement may vary, in terms of
“official encouragement, outright subsidies, and governmental coordination,”313 there is clearly a concerted effort in some developing countries
to engage in culture change—whether as a human rights matter, as in
efforts to eradicate female genital mutilation, or as an economic development issue. This process includes the construction of social capital
through educational reform and various forms of civic participation
306. Harrison, Promoting Progressive Cultural Change, supra note 183, at 303.
307. Id.
308. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 974
(1996).
309. Id. at 973 (citation omitted).
310. Id. at 973 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted); see also id. at 975 (describing
how education is a vehicle for government norm management: “[e]ducation thus proceeds (1)
through a practice, (2) directed by an authority, (3) that coerces without appearing to coerce”).
311. Id. at 978 (citations omitted).
312. Id. at 982 (quoting Mary Crain, The Social Construction of National Identity in Highland
Equator, 63 ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 43, 56 (1990)).
313. GARON, supra note 271, at 235.
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which resemble, in broad strokes at least, the earlier efforts towards social management adopted by the Japanese. One could also imagine other
forms of government involvement in culture change, for example, the
government as a “meaning manager or meaning architect who has identified a social meaning that is to be transformed and must find the techniques to achieve this transformation.”314
This could be accomplished through the technique of tying, as Lawrence Lessig puts it, by associating one act with “another social meaning
that conforms to the meaning that the architect wishes the managed act
to have.”315 Through education in schools and coordination with other
civic organizations, these governments could promote certain virtues,
such as saving and frugality necessary for capital accumulation; a future-oriented mindset that encourages individuals to stop defining themselves primarily as occupiers of inherited social status; or a norm that
makes individual accumulation of wealth acceptable or even desirable.
This can be done by tying or associating the desired attributes, for example, with national unity or patriotism. When South Korea faced a currency crisis in 1997 and a record $60 billion USD bailout by the IMF, a
national drive, dubbed the “Nation-loving Gold Collection Campaign,”316 succeeded in inducing, within the first two days, more than
133,000 people to sell or donate over 22,000 pounds of gold to the government.317
Certainly any effort by governments to change cultural meanings
may be viewed pejoratively as propaganda, as a troubling form of “industrial policy for norm generation” resulting in “boundless and oppressive state efforts to manipulate social norms.”318 Some may find it all
the more “chilling”319 when undertaken by liberal states that do not as a
matter of course engage in propaganda or brainwashing. Yet such efforts
may already be pursued by governments, even in the United States.320
314. Lessig, supra note 308, at 1008.
315. Id. at 1009.
316. Hyewook Cheong, S. Korea Gold Campaign Mum on Details, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Jan.
13, 1998.
317. Kyong-Hwa Seok, South Koreans Answer the Call: Citizens Turn in Their Gold to Aid
Besieged Nation, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario), Jan. 7, 1998, at D7.
318. Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2055, 2057, 2060 (1996) (internal quotations omitted).
319. Lessig, supra note 308, at 1008, 1016.
320. Even in the United States, for example, despite proclamations that the government does
not “‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,’” id. at 945 (quoting Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327–28 (7th Cir.
1985)), the U.S. government, as well as governments elsewhere, regularly do.
[G]overnments, as well as others, act to construct the social structures, or social norms,
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“Governments trade on standing social meanings to advance state ends,”
which have ranged from promoting “family values” to exclude homosexuals from social integration in the United States, for example, to
constructing race and ethnic identities to build up nationalism in the
former Yugoslavia.321 Depending on the nature of the state’s efforts to
produce and reshape social and cultural norms, this effort towards norm
construction and management may or may not raise the specter of
“thought control.”322 It may if the government allows few other channels for citizens to be exposed to alternative or competing value systems, or if the government backs up its agenda with coercive forms of
state action, as in North Korea or Cultural Revolution China.
It is important at this point to clarify what it is I am not arguing. I am
not claiming “that cultural managers could construct any culture they
wish…or that ‘given the right social context, any social activity can be
turned into a ritual at the whim of ritual specialists.’ Rituals, and the reality they construct, depend upon the values of the parties to that ritual.”323 I am also not arguing that “backward” cultures are the cause of
economic underdevelopment. But I am suggesting that there is some relationship between culture and economic productivity—the degree to
which a relationship exists will depend upon the particularities of history, economics, and politics. Acknowledging that such a link exists,
however, does not mean that culture should be used to “deflect[] attention from other factors which might provide an equally compelling explanation of underdevelopment.”324 The World Trade Organization and
other institutions of the international economic system may in fact be
structurally problematic, as evidenced by the exclusion from WTO
rules, until recently, of textiles and agriculture: two areas in which developing countries have a comparative advantage.
I will end this section with a look at how an indigenous Third World
or…the social meanings that surround us. For these social meanings are what is orthodox. They constitute what is authority for a particular society, or particular culture. To
the extent that they are built, or remade, or managed by government, then to that extent
government is “prescribing” the orthodox.
Id. at 947. One example of government transformation of norms for progressive purposes is the
passage of the Civil Rights Act, which altered the cultural landscape by providing a cultural and
legal safe harbor for businesses that served black customers; by making discrimination illegal, the
law allowed a business who served blacks to be viewed as doing so in order to obey the law, not
necessarily to favor blacks. Id. at 966.
321. Id. at 957.
322. Id. at 945 (internal quotations omitted).
323. Id. at 986 (citation omitted).
324. Chantal Thomas, Causes of Inequality in the International Economic Order: Critical
Race Theory and Postcolonial Development, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (1999).
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institution—the Grameen Bank founded by an economist from Bangladesh—encourages certain cultural change in its borrowers. Unlike traditional banks which make loan determinations based on the borrower’s
access to collateral or his or her general creditworthiness, the Grameen
Bank does not require collateral of the conventional kind. Instead, it relies on social collateral. The bank lends to a circle of five members,
typically women. It grants a loan to the first two borrowers. If the first
two repay their loans, the other individuals in the circle are entitled to
loans. Those who received a loan are responsible, by their repayment or
non-repayment, for whether or not others are qualified to borrow.325
In addition, the bank undertakes to introduce a social development
agenda to its borrowers, as reflected in the “Sixteen Decisions” which
Grameen borrowers are expected to adopt.326 The purpose of the bank is
to help people in poor countries cross the poverty line economically and
also to live “a life of dignity and honour.”327 The bank believes that although “credit is an efficient instrument that can quickly augment income, poverty has many dimensions,”328 which include social and political consciousness; Grameen Bank’s “Sixteen Decisions” reflect the
bank’s effort to address the social elements of poverty.
At weekly meetings, borrowers agree to follow and advance these
principles of Grameen Bank: “Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard
Work.”329 The purpose of the sixteen decisions is to encourage sound
financial discipline as well as to instill in borrowers certain social
goals.330 Borrowers are encouraged to memorize and recite the Sixteen
Decisions, some of which deal with mundane subjects such as sanitation
(“‘We shall build and use pit latrines’”), nutrition (“‘We shall grow
vegetables all year round’”), as well as more sensitive topics.331 Examples of the latter include the pledge to educate their children; not take
any dowry at sons’ weddings and not give any dowry at their daughters’

325. Grameen Bank Credit Delivery System, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html
(last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
326. Id.
327. Alleviation of Poverty is a Matter of Will: Hearing on Aid Targeted to Small Enterprise
Development Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Rel., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Professor Muhammad Yunus, Managing Director, Grameen Bank).
328. Id.
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weddings; not practice child marriage;332 and not overspend on weddings and funerals.333 The underlying principle behind the Sixteen Decisions is nurturing pride334 and discipline,335 including a “deferral of selfish gratification by saving and educating children for example.” This
effort is in fact not different from that taken by Japan, when it pursued
culture change, in the 1800s, as I described above.

CONCLUSION
In the post-September 11 world, with development elevated into a national security issue, it is especially important to assess the field’s overarching principles. I have demonstrated that law and development has
been focused almost exclusively on the formal aspects of law, on codes
and legislation and courts. It has neglected the less quantifiable, though
crucial, task of changing habits, mindsets, traditional ideas, or what I
call, in this Article, culture. This Article advocates a fundamental shift
in law and development work—a reinvigoration that focuses on culture
and on culture change.
I have provided several explanations for the neglect of culture in law
and development. First, other scholarly fields most directly connected to
law and development also shun culture. International law, public and
private, has historically avoided culture. For public international law,
culture is subsumed within each state’s domestic jurisdiction. Public international law purports to articulate universal rules; as culture is particularistic, reflecting the history and tradition of individual states, public international law sidesteps internal cultural issues. Private
international law, or international economic law, also disregards culture,
but on different grounds. Private international law is about business and
economics; its stated aim is to establish an international economic
framework that is stable, predictable, and rational. To the extent that
culture is generally considered “messy,” non-tangible, or arbitrary, inherited or not freely chosen, it is not equated with rationality and thus
not a matter private international law wishes to address or incorporate in
its domain. To the contrary, private international law would prefer that
culture be “cabined” and segregated from economic deliberations.
Law and development as a scholarly field inherits the framework
332. The 16 Decisions of Grameen Bank, supra note 329.
333. Tinker, supra note 330, at 232.
334. Tempest, supra note 331.
335. William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development Movement, 2002 WIS. L.
REV. 377, 421–22.
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erected by international law and thus is similarly reluctant to address
cultural issues. In addition, most law and development scholars are from
the liberal or critical tradition and thus are all too aware of the Orientalist tradition that misinterprets and belittles non-European cultures.
My aim in this Article is to examine culture and markets and to assert
that there is, in fact, a link between the two. Where certain cultural attributes retard the economic development of a country because it is economically dysfunctional, I propose that deliberate efforts be taken to alter such attributes. The Article, in other words, proposes that law and
development take on the issue of culture change. This suggestion is
based on a limited proposition—that if economic development is linked
to culture and may be aided or impeded by culture, changing certain
cultural practices and beliefs would facilitate economic development. It
does not involve normative evaluations of any culture, nor does it attempt to assess the intrinsic worth of any culture (beyond the relationship between culture and economic development), nor does it preclude
examination of historical and structural impediments to development.
The field of human rights recognizes that certain human rights violations are rooted in cultural traditions. Such traditions must be altered in
ways that reach deeper than legislation or codification. Ratified by 179
states, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, for example, requires that signatory states promote equality by
passing any necessary laws to eliminate discrimination against women
and to promote the principle of the equality of men and women. But it
also requires states to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes.”336 Culture change—changing cultural patterns of conduct as proposed by
some human rights advocates—should be actively pursued in the field
of law and development.

336. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 5, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.

